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Key points
•	 The	 territorial	 extensiveness	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 brings	 about	 an	
immense	diversity	 in	 terms	of	geographic,	economic	and	ethnic	 features	
of	 individual	 regions.	This	diversity	 is	 reflected	by	serious	disparities	 in	
the	regions’	levels	of	development,	as	well	as	their	national	identity,	civic	
awareness,	social	and	political	activity.	We	are	in	fact	dealing	with	a	‘mul-
ti-speed	 Russia’:	 along	 with	 the	 economically	 developed,	 post-industrial	
regions	 inhabited	by	active	communities,	 there	are	poverty-stricken,	 in-
ertial	regions,	dependent	on	support	and	subsidies	from	the	centre.	Large	
cities,	with	their	higher	 living	standards,	concentration	of	social	capital,	
a	 growing	 need	 for	 pluralism	 in	 politics	 and	 elections	 characterised	 by	
competition	 constitute	 specific	 ‘islands	of	 activity’	 on	Russia’s	map.	This	
proves	once	again	that	the	social	changes	that	are	taking	place	 in	Russia	
along	with	generational	change,	economic	development	and	technological	
progress,	are	in	fact	insular	in	nature.
•	 The	current	model	of	relations	between	Moscow	and	the	regions	has	been	
shaped	by	the	policy	of	centralisation	pursued	by	the	Kremlin	since	2000.	
The	priority	of	this	policy	has	been	to	restore	the	president’s	dominance	in	
the	system	of	government,	by	regaining	control	over	regional	elites	 (and	
other	political	 and	business	actors)	and	by	redirecting	financial	flows	 to	
the	central	budget,	to	be	arbitrarily	redistributed	by	the	Kremlin.	As	a	re-
sult	of	this	policy,	the	autonomy	of	the	Russian	regions	has	been	reduced	
fundamentally,	and	their	capacity	to	conduct	policies	based	on	their	speci-
ficity	is	extremely	limited.	The	central	government’s	control	(political,	eco-
nomic	and	administrative)	over	the	regions	is	currently	so	thorough	that	
it	contradicts	the	formally	existing	federal	form	of	government	in	Russia.
•	 The	 policy	 of	 centralisation	 creates	 a	 number	 of	 negative	 consequences	
for	the	development	of	the	regions.	Firstly,	the	restriction	of	the	regions’	
political	and	economic	autonomy	has	affected	the	performance	of	the	re-
gional	elites.	Their	priorities	have	shifted	from	focusing	on	the	region	to	
seeking	 favours	 from	 the	 Kremlin,	 whose	 will	 determines	 the	 political	
outlooks	of	the	regional	heads	and	the	condition	of	regional	budgets.	This	
model	promotes	the	role	of	the	region	as	a	passive	supplicant,	for	whom	it	is	
easier	to	seek	support	from	the	central	government,	offering	loyalty	in	ex-
change,	than	to	implement	complex	systemic	reforms	that	would	contrib-
ute	to	long-term	development.	One	of	the	measurable	effects	of	this	policy	
is	 the	 constantly	 decreasing	number	 of	 the	donor	 regions.	 Secondly,	 the	
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centralisation	policy	makes	it	difficult	for	the	regions	to	use	their	natural	
advantages	to	their	benefit;	they	are	unable	to	influence	the	implementa-
tion	of	 large	 investments	 into	 their	 territory	 (such	as	 the	exploitation	of	
raw	materials)	 or	 the	 establishment	 of	 special	 economic	 zones.	 Regions	
with	a	distinctive	specificity	and	significant	resources	perceive	the	current	
model	as	quasi-colonial,	one	which	limits	their	opportunities	for	growth,	
and	are	therefore	interested	in	reconstructing	that	model.
•	 On	the	other	hand,	the	mainstay	of	the	current	‘asymmetric’	model	of	fed-
eralism	are	the	poor	and	inertial	regions,	which	nevertheless	have	a	nu-
merical	superiority	over	the	rich	ones.	These	regions	are	not	interested	in	
expanding	their	autonomy,	as	it	would	involve	the	need	to	find	new	sources	
of	income	independently,	for	which	they	are	not	prepared;	they	lack	both	
natural	 competitive	 advantages	 and	 the	 habits	 of	 activity	 and	 entrepre-
neurship.	These	regions	see	their	only	opportunity	to	improve	their	finan-
cial	condition	in	the	central	government’s	aid	and	assistance,	and	are	pre-
pared	to	provide	Moscow	with	unconditional	political	support	in	return.
•	 The	new	phase	of	the	centralisation	policy,	which	began	with	Vladimir	Pu-
tin’s	return	to	the	Kremlin	in	2012,	further	restricts	the	regions’	room	for	
manoeuvre,	mainly	by	 imposing	 additional	financial	 burdens	 on	 the	 re-
gional	budgets.	Currently,	 two-thirds	of	the	regional	budget	are	running	
deficits,	and	the	regional	governments	have	difficulties	striking	a	balance	
between	 increasing	 pressure	 from	Moscow	 and	 the	 financial	 and	 social	
problems	of	their	regions,	which	trigger	social	 frustration.	However,	 the	
regional	elites’	limited	influence	does	not	allow	them	to	lobby	for	favoura-
ble	systemic	solutions.	In	addition,	the	poor	‘political	quality’	of	the	region-
al	elites	is	yet	another	legacy	of	the	policy	of	centralisation;	regional	politi-
cians	 lack	the	capacity	for	strategic	planning,	 for	acting	in	the	collective	
interest,	and	for	coordinating	their	initiatives	inter-regionally,	especially	
when	those	initiatives	run	counter	to	the	policy	of	the	centre.	Instead,	par-
ticularistic	attitudes	prevail	in	the	regions;	their	elites	use	informal	chan-
nels	to	lobby	the	interests	of	their	own	regions,	which	are	often	narrowed	
down	to	the	interests	of	the	local	ruling	clans.
•	 The	existing	model	of	relations	between	the	centre	and	the	regions,	which	
entails	the	overwhelming	dominance	of	Moscow,	has	not	been	shaped	by	in-
stitutional	mechanisms	and	official	arrangements	between	different	levels	
of	government	and	society.	Instead,	it	has	been	a	result	of	a	number	of	pro-
visional	factors,	with	the	leading	role	being	taken	by	economic	conditions	
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and	personal	 issues,	such	as	 the	composition,	mentality	and	priorities	of	
Vladimir	Putin’s	team.	Institutional	weakness	and	a	susceptibility	to	po-
litical	and	economic	fluctuations	prevent	this	model	from	being	a	constant	
and	final	one,	and	make	these	relations	cyclical	in	nature.	Currently	Russia	
is	 facing	a	change	in	two	key	factors,	economic	(prospects	of	stagnation)	
and	political	(the	deteriorating	legitimacy	of	the	ruling	elite).	In	the	per-
spective	of	the	next	few	years,	the	escalation	of	these	trends	may	lead	to	the	
erosion	of	the	ruling	system	in	the	Kremlin	and	enhance	the	active	regions’	
efforts	to	alter	the	model	of	relations	with	the	centre.	However,	the	degree	
of	institutional	weakness	and	the	ruling	groups’	lack	of	democratic	habits	
may	turn	the	process	of	negotiating	new	principles	of	relations	into	yet	an-
other	behind-the-scenes	arrangements	between	 the	 federal	and	regional	
elites,	with	the	latter	guided	not	so	much	by	the	interests	of	their	regions,	
as	by	the	interests	of	their	clans.	As	a	result,	the	alternative	to	the	current	
centralised	model	may	be	not	so	much	a	mature	federal	model,	as	another	
variation	of	a	deformed	federalism,	reminiscent	of	the	1990s,	whose	benefi-
ciaries	were	selected	regional	‘barons’.
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introduction
The	 regional	 differentiation	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 and	 the	 relations	 be-
tween	the	capital	and	the	regions	are	often	treated	as	an	element	of	broader	
political	 and	 economic	 studies.	 However,	 they	 deserve	 separate	 analysis.	
Firstly,	the	country’s	great	geographic,	economic,	ethnic	and	social	diversity	
affects	the	direction	and	pace	of	development	of	the	entire	Russian	Federation,	
as	well	 as	 its	 socio-economic	 stability.	 Secondly,	 the	 aforementioned	 factors	
determine	the	practical	implementation	of	many	strategies	mapped	out	in	the	
Kremlin.	Thirdly,	an	analysis	of	Russian	federalism	is	one	of	the	key	elements	
in	the	study	of	the	entire	system	of	government;	 it	once	again	demonstrates	
Russia’s	 institutional	weakness	and	 the	 system’s	 ‘ductility’,	while	 indicating	
that	the	current	form	of	federalism,	with	its	far-reaching	centralisation,	is	not	
permanent	and	final	either.	It	therefore	seems	important	to	take	notice	of	the	
voice	of	the	regions,	which	is	often	depreciated	due	to	the	present-day	domina-
tion	of	Moscow,	as	it	might	be	helpful	in	reflecting	on	the	shape	of	the	Russian	
system	if	it	should	evolve	towards	a	more	decentralised	model.
It	should	be	specified	that	this	paper	focuses	mainly	on	the	wealthier	regions	
or	those	with	a	distinctive	specificity,	which	translates	into	certain	expecta-
tions	of	the	central	government	and	the	capacity	to	seek	their	implementation.	
The	study	deliberately	does	not	engage	in	a	detailed	analysis	of	poorer	regions,	
even	though	in	the	scale	of	the	Russian	Federation	they	predominate	in	terms	of	
population	and	area.	The	main	reason	is	that	the	weakness	of	their	economies	
makes	 them	hyper-dependent	on	 the	centre:	 they	act	as	passive	supplicants	
vis-à-vis	Moscow,	who	do	not	carry	out	or	even	formulate	their	own	policies,	
and	only	seek	greater	 funding	within	 the	existing	system.	Such	regions	are	
and	will	remain	passive	witnesses	of	a	game	between	the	Kremlin	and	those	
regions	with	distinctive	specificity	and	greater	ambitions.	Nor	does	this	study	
deal	with	the	case	of	 the	North	Caucasus,	whose	 internal	specifics	and	rela-
tions	with	Moscow	exceed	the	standard	framework	of	Russia’s	regional	policy,	
and	have	been	described	in	separate	studies1.
The	text	opens	with	a	chapter	describing	the	evolution	of	Russian	federalism	in	
the	1990s,	following	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	when	the	weakened	central	au-
thority	played	second	fiddle	to	strong,	ambitious	regions.	The	second	chapter	
1	 W.	Górecki,	No	 change	 in	 the	Russian	Caucasus.	The	winter	Olympics	 amid	a	 local	war,	
OSW	Studies,	27	Jan.	2014,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-01-27/
no-change-russian-caucasus-winter-olympics-amid-a-local-war
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shows	the	evolution	of	this	model	under	the	policy	of	centralisation,	initiated	
by	Vladimir	Putin	in	2000.	The	third	chapter	presents	the	diversity	of	the	Rus-
sian	 regions	 by	 describing	 selected	 regions	 with	 distinctive	 characteristics	
(related	 to	 geography,	 resources,	 ethnic	 composition)	 and	 specific	 interests.	
The	fourth	chapter	analyses	the	stance	of	the	active	regions	towards	centrali-
sation,	 their	expectations	and	 (limited)	possibilities	 to	 fulfil	 them.	The	fifth	
chapter	presents	the	reactivation	of	the	policy	of	centralisation	upon	Vladimir	
Putin’s	return	to	the	Kremlin	in	2012.	The	study	is	concluded	with	a	chapter	
outlining	the	prospects	of	relations	between	Moscow	and	the	regions	 in	 the	
coming	years,	including	the	evolution	of	the	current	centralised	model.
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i. post-soViet neGotiAted FederALisM 
Following	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	a	specific	type	of	federalism	formed	
in	Russia	that	lasted	for	almost	a	decade	and	was	characterised	by	the	weak-
ness	of	central	authority	and	the	assertiveness	of	key	political	and	economic	
actors	–	big	business	(oligarchs),	political	parties	and	regional	elites.	The	fed-
eral	 elite	 was	 struggling	 with	 the	 hardships	 of	 transition	 and	 serious	 eco-
nomic	difficulties,	and	was	additionally	weakened	by	the	personal	problems	of	
President	Boris	Yeltsin	–	every	so	often,	the	Kremlin	was	forced	to	‘exchange’	
concessions	to	the	aforementioned	players	for	their	political	or	economic	sup-
port.	The	regional	elites	took	full	advantage	of	Yeltsin’s	famous	appeal:	‘Take	as	
much	independence	as	you	can	swallow’.	The	balance	of	power	in	the	Russian	
Federation	clearly	shifted	in	favour	of	the	regions,	especially	the	more	affluent	
ones	(the	so-called	‘donor’	regions,	i.e.	net	contributors	to	the	Russian	budget)	
who	had	 their	distinctive	specificity	and	 identity,	and	demonstrated	aspira-
tions	to	extend	their	autonomy	to	derive	more	profits.	This	was	the	time	of	the	
greatest	political	and	economic	pluralism	in	post-Soviet	Russia,	albeit	saddled	
with	serious	deficiencies	that	hindered	the	emergence	of	a	mature	federalism.
The	shape	of	the	federal	model	of	that	time	was	heavily	affected	by	the	Soviet	
legacy;	the	generation	of	regional	politicians	in	power	had	been	raised	in	the	
Soviet	Union,	and	was	characterised	by	an	authoritarian political culture.	
Their	 pursuit	 of	 greater	 autonomy	was	 not	 (as	 in	 developed	 countries	with	
a	federal	system)	synonymous	with	decentralisation	and	a	division	of	powers	
which	would	have	helped	 to	prevent	malpractices	at	 all	 levels.	 It	 is	 sympto-
matic	that	the	biggest	enclaves	of	authoritarianism	in	the	1990s	developed	in	
those	regions	that	enjoyed	the	greatest	degree	of	autonomy,	such	as	Tatarstan	
and	Bashkortostan2.
Another	 deficiency	 was	 institutional weakness.	 The	 Kremlin’s	 relations	
with	the	regions	(and	with	other	actors)	were	heavily	personalised	and	often	
resembled	behind-the-scenes	bargaining	from	which	the	public	was	exclud-
ed.	The	course	of	this	bargaining	was	dependent	on	the	economic	potential	of	
a	given	region,	on	the	position	of	individual	governors	and	their	connections	in	
the	relevant	structures	of	the	central	government.	As	a	result,	some	regional	
‘barons’	extorted	successive	economic	privileges	 from	Moscow	and	their	re-
gions	were	bedizened	with	symbolic	attributes	of	 ‘independence’:	references	
2	 A.	Zakharov,	Spyashchiy	institut:	federalism	v	Rossii	i	sovremennom	mirye,	Moscow	2012,	
pp.	7-8.
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to	‘sovereignty’	in	regional	constitutions	(Yakutia,	Tatarstan,	Bashkortostan,	
Tuva),	insets	in	national	languages	inserted	in	passports	(Tatarstan,	Bashkor-
tostan,	Dagestan),	trade	representations	abroad,	or	the	reconstruction	of	his-
toric	heritage	with	some	anti-Russian	overtones	(e.g.	the	restoration	of	the	Kul-
Sharif	mosque	in	Tatarstan,	which	had	been	burned	by	Ivan	the	Terrible	after	
the	 capture	 of	 Kazan).	 The	most	 self-confident	 regions	 –	 Tatarstan	 and	 the	
Chechen-Ingush	republic	–	even	refused	to	sign	the	Federal	Treaty	in	1992	con-
cerning	 the	 division	 of	 powers	 between	 the	 centre	 and	 the	 regions3,	which	
they	 saw	 as	 confirmation	 of	 the	 regions’	 vulnerability	 vis-à-vis	 the	 centre.	
Throughout	 the	entire	decade,	 the	central	government	concluded	 individual	
contracts	with	the	regions	that	specified	the	division	of	powers	in	the	spheres	
of	economy,	budget,	property	rights,	financial,	monetary	and	customs	policy.	
By	1998,	42	such	agreements	had	been	concluded	(out	of	89	then	existing	re-
gions).	A	symptom	of	this	was	the	fact	that	the	powers	of	individual	regions	
varied	greatly	 and	depended	on	 their	political	 importance	and	 the	 lobbying	
potential	of	the	region’s	elites4.	A	unique	agreement,	even	in	that	context,	was	
the	one	which	the	President	of	Tatarstan	Mintimer	Shaimiev	signed	with	Mos-
cow;	the	republic	was	granted	the	status	of	a	sovereign	state	associated	with	
Russia	and	a	subject	of	 international	 law5.	The	political	crowning	of	this	re-
gional ‘Fronde’	was	the	foundation	of	the	Fatherland-All	Russia	party	in	1999,	
whose	backbone	were	the	elites	of	the	donor	regions.	One	of	the	party’s	lead-
ers,	Yevgeny	Primakov,	was	even	a	serious	contender	to	Vladimir	Putin	in	the	
presidential	election	in	2000.
To	describe	the	position	of	regional	elites	in	the	1990s,	some	scholars	use	the	
term	‘parade	of	sovereignties’,	referring	to	the	successive	declarations	of	sov-
ereignty	of	the	Soviet	republics	towards	the	end	of	the	Soviet	Union,	which	ini-
tiated	its	collapse.	The	1990s	were	engraved	in	the	public	memory	–	especially	
after	2000	–	as	a	time	when	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	Russian	Federation	
was	at	risk,	and	that	risk	was	aggravated	by	the	chaos	of	transformation,	eco-
nomic	hardships	 and	 the	 ambitions	of	 ‘regional	barons’.	 Scholars	define	 the	
3	 The	Federation	Treaty	(31	March	1992)	was	an	agreement	that	regulated	the	relations	with-
in	the	Russian	Federation	and	divided	the	powers	between	the	federal	authorities	and	the	
regions	contained	in	three	groups:	1.	republics;	2.	territories,	regions	and	cities	with	a	fed-
eral	status	(Moscow	and	St.	Petersburg);	3.	autonomous	regions	and	autonomous	areas.
4	 L.	Polishchuk,	‘The	Russian	Model	of	Negotiated	Federalism’,	in	Klimanov,	V.,	and	Zubarev-
ich,	N.,	eds.,	The	Regional	Dimension	of	Politics	and	Economics	(Moscow,	St.	Petersburg:	
Studia	Politica,	2000).
5	 L.	 Ambinder,	 ‘Mintimer	 Shaimiev:	 Lider	 v	 borbye	 regionalnykh	 elit’,	Kommersant	 daily,	
30	March	1996.
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Russian	variant	of	 federalism	 in	 the	 1990s	as	negotiated federalism,	 stressing	
that	it	contradicts	the	fundamental	principle	of	a	federal	state	as	a	fixed	and	
clear	division	of	powers	and	spheres	of	activity	between	the	authorities	of	the	
federal	and	regional	levels,	each	of	whom	operates	autonomously	within	their	
own	sphere	of	competence6.
6	 L.	Polishchuk, op. cit.
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ii. tHe LAndscApe AFter centrALisAtion
The	turning	point	for	the	centre-regions	relations	was	the	election	of	Vladimir	
Putin	as	president	in	2000.	This	marked	the	rebuilding	of	the	Kremlin’s	posi-
tion,	which	was	supported	by	soaring	oil	prices	and	solid	public	acceptance	for	
the	new	president’s	actions,	including	the	‘restoration	of	the	territorial	integri-
ty	of	the	country’	(which	in	the	public	perception	was	challenged	by	the	eman-
cipation	of	the	regional	elites)	and	for	a	broadly	defined	‘order’	(consisting	in	
the	subordination	of	the	key	political	and	economic	players).	In	the	following	
years,	the	centralisation	of	power	initiated	by	Putin	has	completely	changed	
the	balance	of	power	between	the	Kremlin	and	other	political	and	economic	
players,	including	the	regional	elites,	and	Moscow	has	regained	the	role	of	the	
centre	that	concentrates	power	and	resources.	The	restoration	of	the	Kremlin’s	
dominance	was	dubbed	the	‘strengthening	of	the	vertical	of	executive	power’	
(Russian:	vertikal vlasti)	and	this	term	has	dominated	the	political	discourse	in	
Russia	since	2000.
The	year	2000	marked	 the	weakening	of	 the	position	of	 regional	 leaders,	as	
a	result	of	legal	amendments	that	have	changed	the	legal	framework	of	their	
activity,	informal	actions,	inspired	by	the	Kremlin,	and	by	Moscow	acquiring	
control	over	the	regions’	strategic	assets7.
The	 process	 of	 harmonising regional laws with federal	 legislation was	
launched,	 including	the	removal	of	references	to	 ‘sovereignty’	 from	regional	
constitutions	 and	 laws,	 as	well	 as	 other	 provisions	 that	 contradicted	 feder-
al	norms.	Under	a	presidential	decree	of	 13	May	2000,	an	additional	 level	of	
administration	was	 introduced	which	was	not	 reflected	 in	 the	Constitution:	
along	with	 the	division	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 into	 ‘federal	 subjects’	 (re-
gions),	it	was	divided	into	seven	federal	districts.	These	are	headed	by	pleni-
potentiary	envoys,	official	representatives	of	the	president	whose	function	is	
to	 ensure	 the	 realisation	of	his	 constitutional	powers	 in	 the	district,	 and	 to	
act	as	advisory	and	control	bodies	with	regard	to	regional	governments.	They	
are	responsible	for	monitoring	the	situation	in	the	regions	and	providing	in-
formation	to	the	Kremlin;	overseeing	the	harmonisation	of	regional	laws	with	
7	 In	 2009,	Moscow	 took	 control	 of	 Bashkortostan’s	main	 asset,	 the	 Bashneft	 oil	 company	
(via	the	Moscow-based	AFK	Sistema	company	which	bought	a	controlling	stake).	This	has	
strengthened	Moscow’s	influence	in	the	region	and	made		it	possible	to	force	the	resigna-
tion	of	Bashkortostan’s	long-time	president	Murtaza	Rakhimov	one	year	later.	In	the	case	
of	Yakutia,	control	over	the	world’s	largest	diamond	mining	company	Alrosa	was	acquired	
through	regular	management	exchanges	(the	state	holds	a	majority	stake	in	the	company).
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the	federal	legislation	and	selected	aspects	of	regional	fiscal	policy;	and	par-
ticipating	in	consultations	concerning	regional	elections.	Despite	their	limited	
formal	powers,	in	the	initial	phase	of	the	centralisation	policy	the	presidential	
envoys	played	a	significant	role	 in	 limiting	the	autonomy	of	 the	regions	and	
subordinating	them	to	the	central	government.
The	centre	has	also	strengthened its control over the regional institutions 
of force;	 the	 right	 to	appoint	heads	of	 their	 regional	 structures	has	become	
the	exclusive	prerogative	of	the	president	of	the	Russian	Federation.	In	2002,	
the	regional leaders lost their senatorial status;	they	had	to	leave	the	Fed-
eration	Council,	 the	upper	house	of	parliament,	 thus	 losing	influence	on	the	
legislative	process	at	 the	federal	 level.	 Instead,	 they	became	members	of	 the	
State	 Council,	 which	 is	 an	 advisory	 body	 without	 significant	 powers.	 Even	
though	representatives	of	the	regions	still	sit	in	the	Federation	Council	(each	
region	delegates	one	representative	from	the	legislative	and	executive	branch),	
their	rank	is	now	much	lower.	Moreover,	successive	 legal	amendments	have	
reduced	the	regions’	leverage	on	the	appointment	and	dismissal	of	senators8.	
Finally,	the	decisive	blow	in	the	political	position	and	legitimacy	of	the	region-
al	elites	was	the	president’s	initiative	in	2005	to	replace general elections to 
governorships with a system of direct appointment	and	dismissal	by	the	
president9.	During	the	presidencies	of	Putin	and	especially	Medvedev,	a	deep	
reshuffle	of	regional	elites	was	carried	out	(under	Medvedev,	a	quarter	of	the	
gubernatorial	corps	was	replaced).	As	a	result	of	this	process,	the	regions	were	
headed	–	with	very	few	exceptions	–	by	politicians	devoid	of	influence	and	cha-
risma,	rendered	impotent	and	aware	of	their	dependence	on	the	centre.
The	budget and tax reform	proved	to	be	a	key	tool	to	limit	the	autonomy	of	the	
regions.	Under	the	changes	introduced	in	2000-2001,	the	share	of	the	central	
budget	revenues	significantly	increased	at	the	expense	of	regional	budgets:	the	
8	 According	to	recent	amendments,	the	governor	and	regional	parliament	 lose	the	right	to	
recall	a	senator	from	their	region;	this	may	now	only	be	done	by	the	chamber.	At	the	same	
time,	residency	requirements	were	 introduced	for	senators	 (the	candidate	 is	required	to	
have	lived	in	the	region	for	at	least	five	years),	as	previously	there	had	been	many	instances	
of	persons	linked	to	the	ruling	elite	but	having	no	links	with	the	region	being	nominated	
senators.	These	were	often	businessmen-billionaires,	who	thus	gained	immunity,	such	as	
Sergei	Pugachev	(representative	of	the	executive	power	of	the	Tuva	region	in	2001-11),	Bo-
ris	Shpigel	(Penza	oblast,	2003-13),	Dmitry	Ananyev	(Yamalo-Nenets	autonomous	district,	
2006-13),	Vitaly	Malkin	(Buryatia,	2004-2013),	and	Ludmila	Narusova,	wife	of	Anatoly	Sob-
chak,	Putin’s	former	mentor	(representative	of	the	Tuva	region	parliament,	2002-12).
9	 Formally,	regional	parliaments	nominated	the	heads	of	the	regions,	voting	among	candi-
dates	proposed	by	the	president	of	Russia.	This	procedure	was	in	force	until	2012.
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share	of	the	centre	in	the	consolidated	budget	increased	from	44%	in	1999	to	
66.2%	in	2007.	In	2005,	a	new	mechanism	was	introduced	for	the	sharing	of	tax	
revenues.	The	taxes	with	the	highest	chargeability	(VAT,	excise,	PIT,	CIT,	Min-
eral	Extraction	Tax)	were	redirected	to	the	central	budget.	Regional	budgets	
have	lost	a	significant	part	of	their	income;	the	division	of	revenues	between	
the	regions	and	the	central	budget	have	changed	from	50/50	before	the	reform,	
to	slightly	above	the	30%	of	taxes	left	in	the	region	(35%	in	2013)10.	In	return,	
regions	were	entitled	to	transfers	from	the	federal	budget,	although	this	did	
not	offset	the	losses	caused	by	the	reform.
The	limitation	of	the	regional	leaders’	economic	room	for	manoeuvre	and	the	
procedure	of	 their	appointment	by	 the	Kremlin	reduced the independence 
and effectiveness of the regional authorities.	Their	priorities	have	shifted	
from	concentration	on	the	region	and	the	interests	of	regional	actors	towards	
seeking	the	Kremlin’s	favour,	whose	will	determined	the	position	of	the	head	
of	 the	region.	This	model	 is	not	conducive	 to	 increasing	the	efficiency	of	re-
gional	economies,	 improving	the	 investment	climate	or	attracting	 investors.	
Instead,	the	regional	elites	are	concentrated	on	lobbying	in	the	federal	offices,	
usually	in	the	interest	of	companies	linked	to	regional	clans	or	partly	to	the	
federal	elite11.	The	motivation	for	this	lobbying	activity	is	further	enhanced	by	
the	opacity	and	arbitrariness	of	the	system	for	distributing	transfers	from	the	
central	budget12.	The	most	glaring	example	of	 this	trend	is	Tatarstan,	one	of	
the	most	effective	regional	lobbyists.	The	Tatarstan	government	is	focused	on	
obtaining	funds	for	large-scale	‘one-off	projects’,	such	as	the	millennium	cel-
ebrations	for	Kazan	city	in	2005	(for	which	the	central	government	allocated	
about	$360	million,	and	over	$1	billion	of	private	investments),	the	Universiade	
in	2013	(over	$1	billion	from	the	state	budget)	and	the	construction	of	a	high-
speed	railway	connecting	Moscow	and	Kazan,	whose	total	cost	was	estimated	
at	about	$30	billion	(although	this	project	has	been	halted	recently).
This	 model	 promotes	 an	 attitude of the regions as passive supplicants,	
wherein	it	 is	easier	to	seek	donations	from	the	centre	than	to	create	favour-
able	conditions	 in	 the	regions	 themselves	 to	develop	and	 invest	 in	new	pro-
jects	 (especially	bearing	 in	mind	 that	 a	 large	portion	of	 taxes	 from	possible	
10	 RBC daily.
11	 L.	Polishchuk,	op. cit.
12	 As	little	as	a	quarter	of	the	transfers	is	allocated	on	the	basis	of	transparent	criteria;	the	
rest	is	divided	arbitrarily.	For	details	see	N.	Zubarevich,	‘Ni	odin	region	ne	imeyet	stimulov	
zarabatyvat’,	Izvestia,	19	September	2013.
16
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
new	investments	would	be	directed	to	the	central	budget13).	The	policy	of	cen-
tralisation	–	the	fiscal	reform,	and	the	restrictions	to	the	autonomy	of	the	re-
gional	authorities	–	seems	to	be	the	main	reason	for	the	steady	decline	in	the	
number	of	Russian	donor	regions	–	from	33-35	in	the	late	1990s14	to	19	in	2007,	
and	as	few	as	10	in	2013,	with	resource-rich	regions	predominating15.
Moreover,	this	model	does	not	offer	the	regions	any	opportunities	to	make full 
use of their natural potential	 and	 to	profit	 from	 their	 competitive	advan-
tages.	In	2004	the	regional	governments	lost	their	leverage	on	the	investment	
policy	 concerning	 the	 extraction	 of	 natural	 resources	 on	 their	 territories:	
the	extraction	licenses	are	now	issued	by	the	federal	Ministry	of	Natural	Re-
sources.	Nor	do	the	regions	have	any	impact	on	the	policies	of	corporations	that	
carry	out	mining	work	on	 their	 territories:	most	of	 the	 large	companies	are	
registered	in	Moscow,	where	they	pay	taxes	and	negotiate	the	terms	of	their	
activities.	 It	 is	also	up	 to	 the	 federal	authorities	 to	grant	 tax	reliefs	 to	 those	
companies,	which	lowers	the	tax	revenues	of	the	regional	budgets	and	reduces	
the	regions’	income.
Instead,	 the	 Kremlin	 often	 offers	 the	 regions	 projects that do not quite 
match their needs and specificity.	An	example	of	 this	 is	 the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast,	 a	 Russian	 exclave	within	 the	 European	Union.	 A	 Special	 Economic	
Zone	 in	 force	 in	 that	 region	 from	 1996	 to	 2006	was	 conducive	 to	 small	 and	
medium-sized	investors,	including	from	abroad.	When	it	expired,	the	federal	
parliament	passed	 a	new	 law	on	 a	 Special	 Economic	Zone,	which	 this	 time	
promotes	 large	 investors	 (with	 investments	 exceeding	 $5	million).	The	new	
zone	has	attracted	only	a	few	dozen	investors,	while	the	majority	of	foreign	
companies	 have	withdrawn	 from	Kaliningrad:	 the	 overall	 number	 of	 com-
panies	with	foreign	capital	has	decreased	fourfold16.	Moscow’s	other	‘flagship	
project’	plans	 in	 the	region,	 such	as	 the	creation	of	a	gambling	zone	on	 the	
Baltic	coast	or	a	tourist	centre,	have	not	been	implemented	at	all.	Moreover,	
Moscow	has	also	limited	the	potential	benefits	for	the	regions	associated	with	
13	 Y.	Zabavina,	‘Poterya	kormilcev’,	Novye Izvestia,	29	April	2013.
14	 See	Natalia	Zubarevich,	http://www.aif.ru/money/29229
15	 The	list	of	donor	regions	currently	includes:	Moscow	city,	Moscow	Oblast,	St.	Petersburg	
city,	Leningrad	oblast,	Republic	of	Tatarstan,	Sakhalin	and	Tyumen	oblasts,	Nenets,	Yama-
lo-Nenets	and	Khanty-Mansi	autonomous	okrugs	(Zabavina,	op. cit.).
16	 J.	 Rogoża,	A.	Wierzbowska,	 I.	Wiśniewska,	 ‘A	 captive	 island:	Kaliningrad	 between	Mos-
cow	 and	 the	 EU’,	 OSW Studies,	 25	 July	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
studies/2012-07-25/a-captive-island-kaliningrad-between-moscow-and-eu
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the	organisation	of	the	2018	World	Cup:	Prime	Minister	Medvedev	transferred	
the	supervision	of	the	infrastructure	construction	to	the	federal	Ministry	of	
Sport,	and	the	government	announced	that	the	main	contractors	to	build	the	
sites	would	not	be	selected	in	a	tender,	but	would	be	appointed	by	administra-
tive	decision,	which	is	likely	to	promote	large	companies	associated	with	the	
ruling	elite	in	Moscow17.
17	 The	companies	linked	to	the	Kremlin	and	controlled	by	the	oligarchs	Gennady	Timchenko	
and	 Arkady	 Rotenberg	 have	 already	 expressed	 their	 interest	 in	 constructing	 the	 infra-
structure	for	the	2018	World	Cup.	All	seven	stadiums	to	be	built	for	the	championship	will	
be	designed	by	the	Sports	Engineering	company,	a	subsidiary	of	the	Ministry	of	Sports.	See	
H.	Aminov,	Y.	Gerashchenko,	‘Sto	millyardov	v	odni	vorota’,	Kommersant,	25	October	2013.
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iii. A MuLti-speed russiA
The	territorial	extensiveness	of	 the	Russian	Federation	results	 in	an	unusu-
al	diversity	of	 individual	regions,	 in	 terms	of	 their	economic	conditions	and	
potentials	(their	resources,	their	 levels	of	economic	development),	as	well	as	
their	ethnic	composition,	national	identity,	social	and	political	activity,	civic	
awareness	and	their	expectations	of	the	government.	The	best-known	typol-
ogy	based	on	the	economic	and	social	criteria	has	been	created	by	the	esteemed	
expert	on	the	regions,	Natalia	Zubarevich,	who	made	a	classification	into	‘four	
Russias’18.	The	 current	 study	 focuses	 on	 several	 selected	 regions	of	 the	Rus-
sian	Federation	and	one	supra-regional	area.	They	have	been	singled	out	due	to	
their	specific	economic,	ethnic	or	geographical	characteristics.	This	specificity	
is	a	starting	point	for	the	analysis	of	these	regions’	identity	and	their	ambitions	
in	their	relations	with	Moscow,	as	well	as	the	civic	and	political	attitudes	of	
their	inhabitants.	A	counterpoint	to	the	active	regions	is	provided	by	a	general	
characterisation	 of	 the	 remaining	 federal	 subjects	 –	 the	more	 passive	 ones,	
that	lack	a	clear	identity,	characteristics	and	resources,	but	which	neverthe-
less	have	a	numerical	superiority	among	the	Russian	Federation	regions.	
One	area	that	stands	out	due	to	 its	economic potential	 (mainly	raw	mate-
rial	resources)	is	Siberia19,	which	is	the	natural	resource	base	of	Russia	–	it	
holds	 the	 largest	natural	 gas	 reserves	 and	 the	 third-largest	 oil	 reserves	 in	
the	world,	huge	forest	areas	and	drinking-water	reservoirs20.	The	relation-
ship	between	the	Russian	capital	and	this	region	can	be	described	as	quasi-
-colonial21,	 both	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 extraction	 and	 export	 of	 natural	
18	 Zubarevich	distinguishes:	Russia-1	–	large,	post-industrial	cities,	inhabited	by	about	21%	of	
the	population,	with	a	large	share	of	middle	class;	Russia-2	–	medium-sized	cities	dominat-
ed	by	heavy	industry	(including	the	so-called	mono-cities),	inhabited	by	25%	of	the	popula-
tion;	Russia-3	–	small	towns	and	villages,	inhabited	by	38%	of	the	population,	who	live	in	an	
almost	autarchic	way,	and	finally	Russia-4	(6%	of	the	population)	–	economically	backward	
regions,	with	a	socio-political	culture	different	 from	the	Russian	mainstream	–	 this	cat-
egory	includes	the	North	Caucasus	and	Tuva.	For	details	see	N.	Zubarevich,	‘Chetyre	Rossii’,	
Vedomosti	daily,	30	December	2011.
19	 For	the	purposes	of	the	current	study,	the	borders	of	Siberia	are	marked	by	the	Siberian	
Federal	District.	The	Federal	District	occupies	30%	of	the	entire	territory	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration	and	consists	of	12	regions:	its	western	borders	are	marked	by	the	Omsk	and	Tomsk	
oblasts,	and	the	eastern	ones	by	Buryatia,	the	Zabaykalsky	krai	and	the	Irkutsk	oblast.	The	
wealthiest	regions	of	the	Federal	District	are	the	Krasnoyarsk	krai	and	the	Kemerovo	oblast	
(Kuzbass).	For	more	information	see	www.sibfo.ru.
20	 For	details	see	V.	Zubov,	V.	Inozemtsev,	Sibirskiy	vyzov,	Moscow	2013,	p.	8.
21	 This	 term	has	been	used	by	Russia’s	most	prominent	experts	on	 regional	policy,	Natalia	
Zubarevich	and	Vladislav	Inozemtsev.
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resources,	as	well	as	the	nature	of	the	investments	Moscow	has	made		there.	
The	scale	of	these	investments	is	limited:	in	the	first	half	of	2013,	the	share	
of	 the	Siberian	Federal	District	 in	 the	central	budget	subsidies	was	a	mere	
11%22.	What	is	more,	the	main	infrastructure	projects	that	are	funded	by	the	
centre,	such	as	the	construction	of	the	ESPO	pipeline,	the	planned	moderni-
sation	of	the	Transsib	and	BAM	railway,	are	mainly	intended	to	improve	the	
process	of	exploitation	and	exportation	of	raw	materials,	and	to	a	much	less-
er	extent	to	enhance	the	socio-economic	development	of	 the	region	and	its	
social	 facilities.	Also,	 the	Siberian	 transport	 system	 is	designed	 to	 a	much	
greater	extent	 to	 facilitate	 the	access	 to	 the	capital	 than	 to	 link	 individual	
regions23.	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	powers	of	the	regional	
administrations	in	the	management	of	the	resources	on	their	own	territories	
are	extremely	limited:	they	have	lost	control	over	the	issue	of	extraction	li-
censes	in	favour	of	the	federal	government,	and	most	corporations	who	carry	
out	mining	work	in	Siberia	are	registered	and	pay	taxes	in	Moscow.	Another	
blow	to	the	Siberian	regions’	budgets	comes	from	the	tax	reliefs	(from	taxes	
that	go	to	regional	budgets,	such	as	income	tax	and	property	tax)	granted	by	
Moscow	to	the	corporations	who	are	linked	to	the	ruling	elite.	For	example,	
the	Rosneft	company,	which	produces	oil	on	the	Krasnoyarsk	Krai	territory	
and	has	noted	a	rapid	increase	of	production	in	recent	years,	has	gained	sig-
nificant	tax	reliefs,	and	consequently	the	budget	of	the	region	has	received	
only	a	small	part	of	the	taxes	due24.
Dissatisfaction	with	being	reduced	to	Russia’s	‘raw	material	base’	has	regular-
ly	been	expressed	by	the	Siberian	elites	–	not	only	in	expert	circles,	but	also	
by	political	leaders.	One	of	the	most	active	lobbyists	for	decentralisation	and	
transferring	some	metropolitan	powers	to	the	regional	level	is	Alexandr	Uss,	
an	influential	Siberian	politician	and	speaker	of	the	Krasnoyarsk	Krai	Parlia-
ment.	During	numerous	conferences	and	forums	devoted	to	Siberia’s	autono-
my,	Uss	has	emphasised	that	the	region	should	assertively	make	up	a	‘Siberian	
agenda’	which	can	be	translated	into	decisions	at	the	federal	level.	Uss	stresses	
that	Siberia	earns	enough	 for	Russia,	and	so	 the	greater	part	of	 these	 funds	
should	remain	in	the	region	and	be	directed	not	only	to	current	social	needs,	
but	also	 to	 investments	 in	 the	region’s	development.	Pointing	 to	 the	region’s	
22	 N.	 Zubarevich,	 ‘Ekonomicheskiy	 separatism	 ili	 zdorovaya	 zhazhda	 zhizni?’,	 Vedomosti,	
20	November	2013.
23	 See	Zubov,	V.	Inozemtsev,	op. cit.,	M.	Trudolubov,	‘Kak	Rossiya	zakhvatila	sama	sebya’,	Ve-
domosti,	25	October	2013.
24	 N.	Zubarevich,	Ekonomicheskiy	separatism,	op. cit.
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desire	 to	profit	 from	 its	vicinity	 to	 the	 rapidly	developing	areas	of	Asia	 and	
the	Pacific,	Uss	has	repeated	Peter	the	Great’s	call	to	 ‘cut	a	window’	not	only	
through	to	Europe	but	also	to	Asia25.
In	 terms	of	 social	distinctiveness,	 a	 specific	 identity	of	Siberians	can	be	de-
fined,	not	linked	to	their	ethnicity,	but	developed	as	a	result	of	living	in	a	se-
vere	climate	and	a	sparsely	populated	area.	Siberians	are	characterised	by	mu-
tual	solidarity,	a	tough	character	and	physical	vigour,	as	well	as	by	a	specific	
Siberian	pronunciation,	and	even	local	dialects26.	The	region	abounds	in	social	
initiatives	highlighting	Siberian	identity	and	advocating	for	the	extension	of	
the	region’s	autonomy:	in	2010,	prior	to	the	all-Russia	census,	a	 ‘True	Siberi-
ans’	social	movement	emerged	in	the	region,	which	called	for	the	indication	of	
a	Siberian	nationality	in	the	census;	while	the	slogan	‘Stop	feeding	Moscow!’	
regularly	appears	at	rallies	and	in	the	rhetoric	of	local	organisations	such	as	
Siberia’s	Regional	Alternative27.	The	Siberian	identity	also	translates	into	po-
litical	attitudes;	politicians	who	win	the	greatest	support	are	those	who	have	
strong	ties	with	the	region,	even	though	they	often	act	under	the	banner	of	na-
tionwide	parties	(regional	parties	are	banned	in	Russia).	The	last	elections	to	
the	Krasnoyarsk	Krai	parliament	in	September	2013	were	won	by	the	Patriots	
of	Russia,	a	party	that	is	marginal	on	a	nationwide	scale,	but	which	is	repre-
sented	in	the	region	by	Anatoly	Bykov,	a	popular	regional	businessman	with	
a	criminal	past.
The	region	with	the	most	expressive	ethnic specificity	(apart	from	the	North	
Caucasus	 republics),	 from	which	 it	 derives	 its	 identity	 and	 cultural	 distinc-
tiveness,	is	tatarstan,	located	in	the	Volga	region.	Tatars	prevail	in	the	ethnic	
structure	of	 the	republic	 (they	make	up	53.2%	of	 the	population,	while	Rus-
sians	 are	 39.7%)28.	 Ethnic	 issues	 are	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 policy	 pur-
sued	by	 the	region’s	government.	 In	recent	years	 the	so-called	 ‘Tatarisation’	
of	the	republic’s	administration	has	been	noted,	as	initiated	by	the	President	
of	Tatarstan	Rustam	Minnikhanov,	who	replaced	the	republic’s	long-standing	
leader	Mintimer	 Shaimiev	 in	 2010.	 ‘Tatarisation’	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 increase	
in	Tatar-speaking	politicians	and	officials	in	the	republic’s	administration	at	
the	expense	of	Russian-speakers.	The	basis	of	this	process,	however,	is	not	so	
25	 Uss	A.,	 ‘We	have	to	make	Siberia	a	territory	of	exceptional	economic	and	social	comfort,	
The	Siberian Times,	11	October	2013.
26	 For	details	see	http://region.krasu.ru/node/84
27	 See	http://altapress.ru/story/65280	and	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xv5Bbep1sg4
28	 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm
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much	ethnic	issues	as	clan	and	business	ties,	and	the	process	itself	is	a	result	
of	a	natural	rotation	following	the	change	of	the	region’s	leader;	Minnikhanov	
and	his	entourage	have	promoted	their	trusted	associates,	who	mostly	derive	
from	Tatar-speaking	villages	and	towns.	Minnikhanov	himself	likes	to	dem-
onstrate	his	ethnic	and	religious	affiliation;	he	publicly	speaks	Tatar,	and	in	
2013	he	performed	a	hajj	(a	pilgrimage)	to	Mecca.
the influence of islam	is	strong	in	the	republic,	and	is	considered	as	one	of	
the	main	distinctions	of	Tatars’	national	 identity.	A	 large	part	of	 the	Tatars	
are	Muslim	 (Sunni),	 but	 their	 exact	number	 is	difficult	 to	 calculate,	 as	 cen-
suses	 in	Russia	do	not	 contain	a	question	on	 citizens’	 religious	beliefs.	Cur-
rently	approximately	1200	mosques	operate	in	Tatarstan	(in	comparison	to	300	
Orthodox	churches)29.	Tatar-language	literature	(including	religious	writings)	
and	halal	products	can	be	bought	in	many	places.	A	non-state	Russian	Islamic	
University	operates	in	the	republic,	educating	muftis	and	Islamic	theologians.	
The	Volga	region	(and	Tatarstan	and	Bashkortostan	in	particular)	is	also	a	site	
of	activity	by	radical	factions	of	Islamists,	such	as	the	Salafists	(including	some	
educated	in	the	United	Arab	Emirates),	for	whom	national	identity	is	a	second-
ary	issue,	and	who	instead	promote	the	spread	of	Islam	and	the	construction	
of	 a	 global	 caliphate,	 and	 take	military	 actions	 aimed	 at	 representatives	 of	
moderate	Islam.	A	radical	Islamic	party	Hizb ut-Tahrir	(banned	by	the	Russian	
authorities)	operates	 in	Tatarstan,	while	 the	number	of	active	supporters	of	
radical	Islam	is	estimated	at	about	300030.	The	armed	Islamic	underground	un-
dertakes	sporadic	acts	of	terror,	including	against	strategic	economic	sites	and	
Orthodox	churches31.
As	mentioned	above,	Tatarstan	enjoyed	extensive	autonomy	in	the	1990s.	Even	
in	the	times	of	centralisation,	its	position	vis-à-vis the	centre	is	much	stronger	
than	 that	of	most	Russian	 regions.	The	Tatar	 leadership’s	 relations	with	 the	
Kremlin	may	recall	the	policy	of	the	Chechen	leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	where-
in	numerous	verbal	declarations	of	loyalty	to	Moscow	and	providing	good	elec-
tion	results	for	the	‘party	of	power’	coexist	with	broad	internal	autonomy	and	
efficient	lobbying	for	expensive	investments	in	the	republic,	which	primarily	
29	 See	http://www.tatworld.ru/anons.shtml
30	 See	Rais	Suleymanov,	Regnum,	9	January	2013,	http://www.regnum.ru/news/1611036.html
31	 In	November	2013,	a	petrochemical	plant	in	Nizhnekamsk	was	machine-gunned;	an	Islam-
ic	militant	who	referred	to	himself	as	an	‘Amir	of	Tatarstan’	took	responsibility	for	the	at-
tack	in	a	speech	on	the	Internet.	Also,	nine	Orthodox	churches	were	burned	in	the	republic	
during	the	second	half	of	2013.
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benefits	the	elite	of	the	region	(see	section	2).	Another	indicator	of	Tatarstan’s	
special	position	may	be	the	fact	that	when	pushing	for	the	dismissal	of	Mintim-
er	Shaimiev	(who	left	in	2010	after	20	years	of	ruling	the	republic),	the	Krem-
lin	left	the	decision	on	the	successor	to	the	outgoing	president,	while	in	many	
other	regions	Moscow	imposed	politicians	lacking	any	connection	to	the	local	
clans,	and	sometimes	even	those	who	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	region.	Ta-
tarstan’s	new	president,	Rustam	Minnikhanov,	is	a	politician	from	Tatarstan,	
an	ethnic	Tatar,	and	closely	linked	to	Shaimiev	by	personal	and	business	ties.
As	in	the	case	of	Chechnya,	the	Tatars’	distinctive	ethnic	and	religious	identity	
leads	them	to	act	in	defence of their national autonomy	(Tatarstan	defends	
the	teaching	of	Tatar	language	in	its	schools,	despite	protests	by	the	Russian-
speaking	population32)	and	their	interpretation of history.	Tatars	have	suc-
ceeded	 in	 blocking	 interpretations	 of	 history	 they	 considered	 unfavourable	
when	national	history	textbooks	were	being	prepared	for	secondary	schools.	
The	draft	textbook	prepared	by	the	Russian	Historical	Society,	at	the	initiative	
of	Vladimir	Putin,	has	faced	opposition	not	only	from	prominent	Tatar	scien-
tists	(starting	with	Rafael	Khakimov,	the	head	of	the	Academy	of	Sciences	of	
Tatarstan)	but	also	 from	politicians,	 such	as	Farid	Mukhametshin,	 the	head	
of	the	Tatar	State	Council,	and	even	the	former	president	Mintimer	Shaimiev	
(who	is	now	an	advisor	to	the	current	leader).	As	a	result,	a	term	used	in	the	
first	draft	(‘the	Tatar-Mongol	yoke’)	has	been	replaced	by	a	more	neutral	for-
mula,	‘a	system	of	dependence	of	Russian	lands	from	the	Horde	khans’;	while	
a	Tatar	poet	Musa	Cälil	was	included	in	the	list	of	prominent	people	who	have	
influenced	the	history	of	Russia33.	On	the	other	hand,	Tatar	history	textbooks	
emphasise	something	which	national	textbooks	overlook	–	the	fact	that	in	1992	
Shaimiev	refused	to	sign	the	Federal	Treaty	put	forward	by	Moscow,	which	is	
presented	as	a	milestone	in	the	development	of	Tatar	national	sovereignty	and	
their	future	independence34.	Tatar	nationalist	groups	also	organise	an	annual	
‘Tatar	Nation	Memory	and	Mourning	Day’,	to	commemorate	the	seizing	of	Ka-
zan	city	by	the	troops	of	Ivan	the	Terrible	in	1552.
32	 The	Tatarstan	State	Council	passed	a	negative	opinion	of	the	proposed	amendments	to	the	
law	‘On	the	languages		of	the	Russian	Federation	peoples’,	which	was	aimed	to	give	the	Rus-
sian	language	the	status	of	‘mother	tongue’	in	all	Russian	regions;	Tatars	considered	that	
this	could	lead	to	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	hours	of	teaching	Tatar	in	their	schools.	See	
K.	Antonov,	‘Kak	ne	rodnoy’,	Kommersant,	26	September	2013.
33	 V.	Khamrayev,	‘Kulikovskuyu	bitvu	vyveli	na	rossiyskiy	rynok’,	Kommersant,	25	September	2013.
34	 Oleg	Kashin,	http://os.colta.ru/mediathek/details/21660
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Some	Russian	regions’	distinctive	location	–	such	as	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	and	
the	Primorsky	Krai	on	the	Sea	of	 Japan	–	significantly	affects	the	identity	of	
their	inhabitants	and	their	elites’	vision	for	the	region’s	development.
the Kaliningrad oblast is a russian exclave surrounded by eu countries;	
this	location	affects	the	identity	and	mentality	of	its	inhabitants.	A	previously	
dominant	sense	of	uprootedness	(the	entire	population	of	the	region	were	im-
migrants)	and	isolation	(the	oblast	was	closed	to	foreigners	due	to	its	strategic	
importance)	have	now	been	replaced	by	a	sense	of	belonging both to europe 
and russia.	This	change	was	caused	by	both	a	process	of	ongoing	generational	
replacement	(one-third	of	the	current	population	was	born	in	the	region,	and	
a	large	part	of	the	remainder	has	been	living	there	for	a	dozen	years	or	more),	
as	well	as	 the	Kaliningraders’	mobility	–	 they	 travel	abroad	much	more	 fre-
quently	than	the	average	Russian35.	Their	mobility	was	additionally	boosted	by	
the	introduction	of	a	local	border	traffic	regime	with	Poland	in	201236,	and	in	
their	perception	the	existing	Schengen	border	with	Poland	has	effectively	be-
come	transparent;	trips	across	the	Polish	border	provinces	have	become	com-
monplace,	while	travel	to	other	Russian	Federation	regions	is	more	time-con-
suming	and	expensive,	as	evidenced	by	a	characteristic	saying	in	Kaliningrad:	
‘I’m	going	to	Russia’.	The	residents’	openness	to	Europe	translates	into	greater	
entrepreneurship	and	civic	activity	(such	as	a	higher	proportion	of	NGOs	than	
the	Russian	average)	and	a	different	political	culture	–	the	election	results	for	
Vladimir	Putin	and	the	‘party	of	power’	United	Russia	in	the	Kaliningrad	re-
gion	have	been	among	the	lowest	in	the	entire	country	for	years37.	Kaliningrad	
was	also	one	of	the	first	regions	to	launch	massive	anti-government	protests	in	
January	2010,	which	resonated	all	over	the	country.
The	awareness	of	their	geographical	distinction	also	affects	the	agenda	of	Ka-
liningrad’s	political	and	economic	elites,	even	though	they	fervently	deny	that	
the	region	has	any	separatist	inclinations38.	The	regional	authorities	have	been	
seeking	travel facilitations	for	years,	which	was	partially	fulfilled	by	the	in-
troduction	of	the	local	border	traffic	regime	with	Poland.	The	Governor	Nikolai	
35	 In	2011,	Kaliningrad	residents	received	a	total	of	215,000	visas	issued	by	the	consulates	of	
the	Schengen	states,	while	in	2012	this	figure	was	260,000	(out	of	955,000	inhabitants).	Data	
provided	by	Poland’s	Consulate	in	Kaliningrad.
36	 Currently	 over	 130,000	people	 have	 local	 border	 traffic	 travel	 cards	 (which	 entitle	 their	
holders	to	travel	to	Poland’s	border	regions	without	a	visa),	and	their	number	is	steadily	
growing.
37	 A	captive	island…,	op. cit.
38	 Interview	with	Governor	Nikolai	Tsukanov	for	the	Regnum	agency,	13	November	2013.
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Tsukanov	has	repeatedly	appealed	for	Kaliningrad	to	be	made	a	pilot	region	
for	 visa-free	 travel	 between	 Russia	 and	 the	 European	 Union.	 Kaliningrad’s	
government	and	business	are	also	interested	in	expanding	economic	coopera-
tion	with	the	EU,	attracting	foreign	investments	and	participating	in	the	EU	
aid	programs	(Northern	Dimension,	CBC	and	other).	They	have	sought	to	cre-
ate	preferential	investment	conditions	in	the	region,	including	in	the	Special	
Economic	Zone,	which	would	 consider	 support	 for	 small	 and	medium-sized	
enterprises	 (see	 section	 2).	A	 barrier	 to	 the	 region’s	 attractiveness	 to	 inves-
tors	is	the	extensive areas of restricted access:	foreigners	are	not	admitted	
to	a	5-kilometer	border	zone	and	other	areas	covering	a	total	of	a	third	of	the	
oblast’s	territory39.	At	the	same	time,	the	local	elites	are	aware	that	they	owe	
major	 infrastructural	 investments	 to	Moscow,	 such	as	 the	modernisation	of	
the	railway	to	Moscow,	the	construction	of	a	modern	passenger	port	in	Pioner-
skoye,	the	development	of	the	Khrabrovo	airport	or	the	construction	of	roads	
(including	Mamonowo-Grzechotki-Sovetsk)	and	bridges,	funded	from	federal	
programs40.	On	 the	other	hand,	despite	 the	endorsement	of	 the	 federal	pro-
gramme	for	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	by	2015,	with	planned	investments	amount-
ing	to	$600	million,	no	funds	have	reached	the	region	so	far.
the primorsky Krai with the capital in Vladivostok	 is	affected	both	by	its	
peripheral	position	vis-à-vis	the	capital,	and	by	its	seaside	location	and	proxim-
ity	to	developed	or	rapidly	developing	economies	of	Asia	and	the	Pacific.	The	re-
gion	itself	suffers	from	its	post-Soviet	legacy	–	in	the	Soviet	Union,	Vladivostok	
was	a	closed	military	port	and	its	industry	was	focused	on	the	needs	of	the	army	
(its	shipyards	produced	ships	for	the	Navy).	The	collapse	of	the	USSR	brought	
the	collapse	of	the	entire	local	industry,	and	unemployment	soared.	Currently	
business	activity	 in	the	region	is	characterised	by	a	high	degree	of	criminali-
sation,	which	 can	 best	 be	 seen	 in	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 branches	 of	 its	
economy,	the	fishing industry41.	Since	the	1990s	this	sector	has	witnessed	the	
coalescence	of	the	local	authorities	and	criminal	structures,	as	evidenced	in	the	
term	‘fish	mafia’,	identified	with	the	former	governor	Sergei	Darkin	who	created	
a	specific	criminalised	network	that	survived	even	after	his	dismissal	in	201242.	
39	 A	captive	island…,	op. cit.
40	 N.	Tsukanov,	op. cit.
41	 As	 ascertained	 by	 the	 Federal	 Anti-Monopoly	 Service,	 50%	 of	 income	 from	 fishing	 goes	
to	the	grey	zone,	and	the	price	of	fish	has	been	inflated	several	 times.	Y.	Skrynnik,	 ‘FAS	
gluboko	nyrnula’,	Vedomosti,	20	April	2011.
42	 N.	 Istomin,	 ‘Primorskaya	rybnaya	mafiya	ostayotsya	na	plavu’,	The Moscow Post,	 18	Octo-	
ber	2013.
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The	regional	economy	is	strongly	affected	by	the	proximity	of	Asian	countries:	
the	Primorsky	Krai	is	an	importer	of	many	categories	of	goods	from	Asia,	such	
as	electronics,	cars,	clothing	and	food.	This	trade	is	conducive	to	the	develop-
ment	of	small	and	medium	businesses	(especially	in	areas	such	as	the	import,	
sale	 and	 service	 of	 cars,	 and	 the	 clothing	 trade)	 and	horizontal	 business	net-
works.	The	residents	of	 the	region	have	repeatedly	demonstrated	 their	deter-
mination	 and	 ability	 to	 self-organise	 in	 defence	 of	 their	 interests	 whenever	
Moscow	tried	to	strike	at	them.	For	example,	in	2005	the	federal	government	an-
nounced	the	introduction	of	a	ban	on	imports	of	cars	with	the	steering	wheel	on	
the	right-hand	side	(cars	imported	from	Japan	make	up	approximately	90%	of	all	
passenger	vehicles	used	in	the	Russian	Far	East).	Mass	protests	broke	out	in	the	
region,	and	many	protesters	tied	orange	ribbons	to	their	cars,	in	a	reference	to	
the	‘Orange	Revolution’	that	was	taking	place	in	Ukraine	at	the	time.	These	were	
some	of	the	first mass grassroots protests in russia	since	2000;	as	a	result,	
the	government	in	Moscow	gave	up	on	the	planned	activities.	In	2008,	the	fed-
eral	government	announced	a	sharp	increase	in	duties	on	imported	cars,	which	
started	another	wave	of	protests	 in	Vladivostok,	organised	by	representatives	
of	 the	 automobile	 business,	 social	 organisations	 (including	 the	 regional	 civic	
organisation	TIGR),	with	political	parties	joining	later	(the	Communists).	Dur-
ing	these	protests,	harsh	anti-government	rhetoric	and	criticism	of	then	Prime	
Minister	Vladimir	Putin	appeared,	which	was	a	novelty	by	Russian	standards43.
Just	as	in	Kaliningrad,	discontent	has	been	manifested	in	the	Primorsky	Krai	
at	 the	projects	 that	 the	Kremlin	 launched	 in	 the	 region,	 such	as	 the	way	 in	
which	the	APEC	summit	was	organised	in	Vladivostok	in	2012,	which	cost	the	
federal	budget	over	$20	billion.	The	location	of	the	summit	on	the	almost	un-
inhabited	Russkiy	island	was	criticised	as	an	idea	that	did	not	match	the	needs	
of	Vladivostok	city:	a	huge	university	campus	was	erected	on	the	island,	which	
was	connected	with	the	mainland	by	a	giant	bridge,	and	a	big	highway	running	
to	the	airport	(while	no	new	road	was	constructed	in	the	city	itself).	Contro-
versy	was	also	sparked	by	the	 low	quality	of	 the	 infrastructure	constructed	
and	the	inflated	costs,	which	was	later	confirmed	by	a	report	by	the	Accounting	
Chamber	that	accused	the	summit’s	organisers	of	embezzlement.	As	a	result,	
the	 ‘shot’	of	federal	investment	has	not	resulted	in	any	modernisation	of	the	
infrastructure	that	the	region	needed	most,	and	has	not	increased	its	invest-
ment	attractiveness.	The	frustration	of	the	Primorsky	Krai’s	residents	at	Mos-
cow’s	initiatives	is	also	manifested	in	their	voting	during	elections;	the	Krai	is	
43	 The	slogans	that	were	raised	during	the	protests	included	‘Putler	kaput’,	http://www.news-
vl.ru/vlad/2009/01/31/miting
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among	the	regions	with	the	lowest election results for Vladimir putin and 
the ‘party of power’, united russia44.
Finally,	a	special	place	on	the	map	of	Russia	is	reserved	for	Moscow,	which	is	
a	centre	of	disproportionately high concentration of capital and human 
resources,	but	also	a	spot	with	a	specific	social	and	political	culture,	clearly	
different	from	the	rest	of	Russia.	Moscow,	especially	within	the	limits	of	the	
so-called	 Garden	 Ring	 (Sadovoye Koltso,	 a	 circular	 ring	 road	 setting	 out	 the	
boundaries	of	the	centre)	is	a	distinctive	island	on	the	economic	map	of	Russia.	
Most	large	Russian	corporations	are	registered	and	maintain	their	headquar-
ters	there,	and	pay	taxes	to	the	metropolitan	budget,	even	though	their	activ-
ity	is	often	carried	out	thousands	of	kilometres	away.	Moscow	tops	the	Forbes	
list	of	dollar	billionaires	living	in	a	city45	and	is	in	the	forefront	of	the	world’s	
most	expensive	cities	(in	2013	it	was	second,	according	to	Forbes).	Moscow	also	
outnumbers	all	other	Russian	regions	when	it	comes	to	living	standards	–the	
average	income	of	a	metropolitan	resident	exceeds	that	in	most	of	the	remain-
ing	regions	by	several	times46.
The	excessive	concentration	of	capital	has	translated	into	the	rapid	develop-
ment	of	Moscow’s	economy,	and	constantly	attracts	the	most	active	residents	of	
other	regions.	Apart	from	higher	living	standards,	the	capital	is	characterised	
by	a	high	percentage	of	educated	people	and	a	well-developed social fabric.	
When	it	comes	to	Moscow,	we	can	say	that	Russia’s	traditional	social	attitudes	
of	passivity,	atomisation,	lack	of	social	trust	and	inability	to	take	grass-roots	
initiatives	have	effectively	been	overcome	here.	Recent	years	have	also	shown	
that	the	residents	of	Moscow	are	in	the	vanguard	in	demonstrating	expecta-
tions for systemic changes;	 for	pluralism	in	 the	economy	and	politics;	and	
for	 a	 democratic	 alternative	 to	 the	 current	 government.	 These	 new	 habits	
have	started	to	affect	the	political	sphere.	So	far,	the	most	tangible	results	of	
Moscow’s	 social	 and	political	 ‘awakening’	have	been	massive	 street	protests	
at	the	turn	of	2011	and	2012,	and	the	Moscow	mayoral	elections	in	September	
2013,	when	the	opposition	candidate	Alexei	Navalny	gained	a	surprisingly	high	
44	 In	the	recent	parliamentary	elections	of	2011	in	the	Primorsky	Krai,	United	Russia	won	33%	
of	the	vote	(with	the	average	nationwide	result	being	49.5%),	and	in	the	city	of	Vladivostok	
it	even	lost	to	the	communists.	Details:	J.	Rogoża,	‘Parliamentary	elections	in	Russia:	poli-
tics	is	back’,	7	December	2011,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-12-07/
parliamentary-elections-russia-politics-back
45	 According	to	Forbes,	78	billionaires	lived	in	Moscow	in	2011,	and	according	to	the	Chinese	
ranking	of	the	Global	Rich	List	in	2013	there	were	76	of	them	in	Moscow.
46	 RIA	Novosti	rating	for	the	year	2013,	http://vid1.rian.ru/ig/ratings/life_2013.pdf,	pp.	12-15.
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result	(over	27%	of	the	votes)47.	The	characteristics	of	Navalny’s	social	base	(the	
younger	generation	of	Moscow	residents)	and	his	novel	election	campaign	may	
be	one	of	the	many	manifestations	of	the	development	of	a	new	social	and	po-
litical	culture,	based	on	a	horizontal,	bottom-up	approach	and	decentralisation	
of	power.	Navalny’s	election	programme	also	included	appeals	to	decentralise	
Moscow’s	management	and	strengthen	local	councils.
The	 abovementioned	 regions	 are	 in	 the	 vanguard	 of	 those	 Russian	 regions	
that	 are	 interested	 in	 systemic	 changes,	 including	 the	extension	of	 their	 au-
tonomy	and	the	ability	to	benefit	from	their	specific	assets.	Should	the	political	
circumstances	become	more	favourable,	 they	are	 likely	to	seek	such	changes	
more	actively.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	scale	of	the	entire	Russian	
Federation,	the	regions	that	predominate	numerically	are	the	ones	which	are	
indigent, resourceless, and devoid of a clear specificity	and	identity.	Exam-
ples	of	such	regions	 in	the	European	part	of	Russia	are	Kalmykia,	Mordovia,	
Mari-El,	the	Oryol,	Kostroma	and	Bryansk	oblasts,	and	in	the	Asian	part	Tuva,	
Buryatia,	the	Zabaykalsky	krai	and	the	Amur	oblast48.	As	a	rule,	these	regions	
are	economically	underdeveloped	and	tend	to	see	their	only	chance	of	improv-
ing	 their	financial	 condition	 in	aid	 from	the	central	government.	Their	deep	
financial	dependence	upon	the	centre	determines	their	supplicant	position	in	
relations	with	Moscow,	who	can	only	seek	the	increase	of	support	in	the	form	of	
grants	and	subsidies,	in	return	for	guarantees	of	loyalty	to	the	Kremlin.
The	societies	in	such	regions	are	usually	trying	to	deal	with	acute	socio-eco-
nomic	problems,	 do	not	 engage	 in	 grassroots	 social	 activity,	 and	 show	 little	
(if	any)	interest	in	politics.	The	lack	of	institutions	for	civic	control	and	of	in-
dependent	media	means	that	political	processes,	including	elections	at	all	lev-
els,	are	far	from	competitive	and	transparent.	The	results	of	elections	within	
such	regions	are	in	fact	based	on	behind-the-scenes	agreements	(in	the	case	
of	electing	the	head	of	the	region,	these	arrangements	include	the	opinion	of	
the	Kremlin),	while	during	federal	elections	the	regions’	authorities	do	their	
best	to	provide	good	election	results	for	candidates	and	parties	associated	with	
the	Kremlin.	In	contrast	to	the	previously	described	‘active’	regions,	the	indi-
gent	and	 inertial	ones	are	uninterested in expanding their autonomy,	 as	
it	would	involve	the	necessity	of	independently	searching	for	new	sources	of	
47	 J.	 Rogoża,	 ‘Regional	 elections	 in	 Russia:	Moscow	 versus	 the	 regions’,	 11	 September	 2013,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-09-11/regional-elections-russia-
moscow-versus-regions
48	 See	footnote	46.
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income,	for	which	they	are	not	prepared;	they	lack	both	natural	competitive	
advantages	(such	as	raw	materials	or	attractive	location)	as	well	as	habits	of	ac-
tivity	and	entrepreneurship.	Therefore,	these	regions	are	the	backbone	of	the	
current	‘asymmetric’	model	of	relations	between	Moscow	and	the	regions,	but	
also	of	the	wider	system	of	government	characterised	by	centralisation,	lack	of	
transparency	and	the	top-down	direction	of	important	processes.
This	 enormous	 diversity,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 description	 of	 the	mentioned	
groups	of	regions,	leads	us	to	talk	about	a	‘multi-speed	Russia’.	On	the	one	hand,	
the	Russian	Federation	has	 ‘islands	of	activity’	–	 large	cities	with	higher	liv-
ing	standards	and	distinctive	specificity,	a	higher	concentration	of	social	capi-
tal,	and	a	growing	need	for	pluralism	in	politics	and	elections	characterised	
by	competition,	where	the	‘party	of	power’	and	the	Kremlin	candidates	tradi-
tionally	gain	lower	results.	On	the	other	side	of	the	scale	are	the	numerically	
dominant,	inert	and	indigent	regions,	financially	and	politically	dependent	on	
the	centre,	which	are	not	interested	in	changing	the	existing	model.	Thus,	the	
social changes	observed	 in	Russia	along	with	the	generational	change,	eco-
nomic	and	technologic	development,	are	distinctively	insular in nature.	Fur-
ther	confirmation	of	this	point	was	provided	by	the	abovementioned	regional	
elections	of	8	September	2013,	which	were	held	in	most	Russian	regions,	and	
once	 again	 showed	how much the individual regional societies differ in 
terms of their political activity, civic awareness and expectations of the 
authorities.
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iV. FerMent in tHe reGions
In	some	regions,	dissatisfaction	at	the	limits	to	their	autonomy	has	existed	in	
a	latent	form	since	the	beginning	of	the	policy	of	centralisation.	Until	recently,	
however,	in	the	times	of	economic	prosperity,	the	relations	between	the	centre	
and	the	regions	were	based	on	the	‘exchange	of	services’	and	were	beneficial	
for	both	sides:	the	centre	expected	the	regions	to	provide	good	election	results	
and	guarantee	social	stability	(no	protests	or	riots)	on	their	territory,	and	in	
return	Moscow	distributed	abundant	income	generated	by	energy	resources,	
and	left	regional	elites	significant	room	for	manoeuvre	concerning	local	mat-
ters.	However,	these	conditions	have	begun	to	change	in	recent	years.	Moscow’s	
political	control	over	the	regional	elites	has	been	intensified,	regional	budgets	
have	been	seriously	burdened	with	social	obligations	(see	section	2),	and	some	
regions	have	lost	control	over	their	strategic	assets	to	Moscow	(Bashkortostan,	
Yakutia),	which	has	weakened	their	bargaining	position.
As	a	result,	some	regions	have	started	to	publicly	express	dissatisfaction	with	
the	Kremlin’s	policies.	This	discontent	came	to	light	at	the	turn	of	2011	and	2012,	
when	the	announcement	that	Putin	and	Medvedev	were	swapping	places	was	
met	with	mass	social	protests	in	Moscow.	For	most	of	the	political,	economic	
and	social	players,	Putin’s	return	equalled	the	abandonment	of	a	gradual	evo-
lution	of	the	system	of	government,	and	a	return	to	a	policy	of	centralisation	
and	‘direct	control’,	as	well	as	a	strengthening	of	the	institutions	of	force’s	po-
sition	 in	 the	 system.	These	prospects	 sparked	unrest	not	 only	 among	active	
social	groups	and	business	circles,	but	also	among	 the	 state	administration,	
including	a	part	of	regional	elites.
Dissatisfaction	with	the	policy	of	the	centre	was	publicly	expressed	by	leaders	
of	certain	regions;	those	with	a	stronger	economic	position	or	distinctive	spec-
ificity	(such	as	the	presidents	of	Tatarstan	and	Bashkortostan,	and	politicians	
from	 the	 Krasnoyarsk	 krai)	 and	 governors	 with	 a	 democratic	 background	
(such	as	Nikita	Bielykh,	the	leader	of	the	Kirov	oblast).	Sometimes	the	regions’	
dissent	was	not	directly	expressed	by	the	local	elites,	but	by	affiliated	political	
groups,	media	or	 loyal	 experts.	The	main	 subjects	of	discontent	became	 the	
scope	of	the	regional	authorities’	competences,	the	scale	of	financial	burdens	
put	on	the	regions,	as	well	as	the	Kremlin’s	demand	to	‘boost’	United	Russia’s	
electoral	results	when	real	public	support	for	the	party	was	in	sharp	decline.	
The	current	division of powers	between	the	centre	and	the	regions	was	open-
ly	 criticised	 by	 the	 former	 president	 of	 Tatarstan,	Mintimer	 Shaimiev	 (and	
a	current	advisor	to	the	new	president	of	Tatarstan;	see	section	3).	Shaimiev	
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appealed	for	the	role	of	the	regions	in	the	relevant	decision-making	processes	
to	be	strengthened,	and	accused	the	Kremlin	of	failing	to	respect	the	principle	
of	separation	of	powers.	Similar	demands	appeared	in	speeches	by	politicians	
from	resource-rich	Siberian	regions,	 including	Alexandr	Uss,	the	speaker	of	
the	Krasnoyarsk	Krai	parliament.	The	presidents	of	Tatarstan	and	Bashkor-
tostan,	Rustam	Minnikhanov	and	Rustem	Khamitov,	criticised	the	Kremlin’s	
2013	initiative	concerning	the	withdrawal	of	direct	elections	for	regional	lead-
ers	 (restored	by	Medvedev	 in	 2012).	The	 regions	have	 also	 expressed	dissat-
isfaction	with	the	growing	dependence	on	the	central	budget	and	additional	
financial	burdens	put	on	the	regions	by	Moscow.	The	Kremlin’s	controversial	
initiatives	(concerning	international	issues	and	moral	aspects)	have	also	been	
subject	to	disapproval,	especially	the	law	prohibiting	US	citizens	from	adopt-
ing	Russian	orphans;	this	was	criticised	by	Kaliningrad	governor	Nikolai	Tsu-
kanov	and	the	Kirov	oblast’s	head	Nikita	Bielykh,	among	others.
The	rise	of	discontent	in	the	regions	has	also	translated	into	the	decreasing 
efficiency of the Kremlin’s ‘electoral machine’,	which	is	based	on	regional	
administrations	 and	 so	 far	 has	 ensured	 good	 results	 for	 Kremlin-affiliated	
parties	and	candidates.	In	the	parliamentary	elections	in	December	2011,	the	
‘party	of	power’	United	Russia	gained	49.3%	of	the	vote	–	almost	15	percentage	
points	less	than	in	the	previous	elections,	and	in	a	few	large	cities	the	party	
even	lost	to	the	communists49.	Meanwhile,	the	media	reported	that	before	the	
election,	the	Presidential	Administration	tasked	the	regions	with	an	informal	
command	to	ensure	65%	of	the	votes	for	the	party.	The	party’s	much	lower	elec-
toral	results	may	be	thus	seen	as	reluctance	by	the	regional	elites	to	take	exces-
sive	risks	in	the	face	of	the	party’s	deteriorating	image	and	dropping	popular-
ity,	the	ferment	within	the	administration,	and	the	activities	of	independent	
election	observers,	who	were	engaged	in	the	election	on	a	mass	scale	and	re-
corded	numerous	violations.
Another	 sign	of	 the	 regional	 elites’	 discontent	with	 the	political	 system	 im-
posed	by	the	Kremlin	may	be	the	symptoms	of	erosion	of	the	‘power	vertical’	
(best	seen	in	the	example	of	United	Russia)	and	the	signs	of	political pluralism	
at	the	regional	level.	The	first	signals	of	this	process	were	several	splits	within	
the	party’s	regional	structures,	especially	regarding	the	case	of	Yevgeny	Ur-
lashov,	who	left	United	Russia	accusing	the	party	of	fraud,	and	in	2012	won	the	
49	 In	St.	Petersburg,	United	Russia	gained	32.5%	of	the	votes,	in	the	Primorsky	Krai	33%,	and	
in	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	37%.	The	party	was	even	defeated	by	the	Communists	in	Kalinin-
grad,	Irkutsk	and	Vladivostok.	See	section	3	of	this	text.
31
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
mayoral	elections	in	Yaroslavl	city.	In	some	regions,	alternative	forces	to	the	
ruling	camp	started	operating	more	actively.	 In	 the	election	of	governor	 for	
Ryazan	oblast,	the	incumbent	head	of	the	region	faced	serious	opposition;	dur-
ing	the	campaign	his	opponent	Igor	Morozov,	a	member	of	the	Patriots	of	Rus-
sia	party,	became	a	focus	of	the	region’s	counter-elite.	A	precedent-setting	situ-
ation	occurred	before	the	election	of	the	governor	for	Bryansk	oblast,	where	
the	incumbent	Nikolai	Denin,	a	member	of	United	Russia,	ran	against	Vadim	
Potomsky,	 a	 popular	 businessman	 associated	 with	 the	 Communists.	 After	
Potomsky	filed	a	complaint	during	the	campaign,	the	regional	court	excluded	
the	incumbent	governor	from	the	election,	which	was	a	non-standard	occur-
rence	in	Russian	realities	(Denin	was	eventually	restored	by	Russia’s	Supreme	
Court	and	won	the	election,	which	can	be	regarded	as	the	result	of	Moscow’s	
intervention).	 In	 2013,	 this	 trend	 continued;	 several candidates from ‘out-
side the system’ achieved spectacular successes:	the	popular	social	activist	
Yevgeny	Roizman	became	the	mayor	of	Ekaterinburg,	 the	democratic	politi-
cian	Galina	Shirshina,	affiliated	with	the	Yabloko	party,	became	the	mayor	of	
Petrozavodsk,	and	opposition	leader	Alexei	Navalny	won	a	surprisingly	high	
percentage	of	votes	in	the	mayoral	election	in	Moscow.	Existing	political	and	
party	arrangements	in	the	regions	have	gradually	begun	to	change;	personal 
exchanges between the parties have intensified,	some	members	of	the	re-
gional	nomenklatura	have	changed	parties,	and	the	entire	process	has	been	ac-
celerated	by	 the	 liberalisation	of	party	 legislation,	 introduced	 in	April	 2012,	
which	significantly	facilitated	the	registration	of	political	parties.	One	of	the	
greatest	beneficiaries	of	this	process	is	the	Civic	Platform	party,	established	by	
the	billionaire	Mikhail	Prokhorov50.
However,	despite	the	symptoms	of	erosion	of	the	Kremlin	 ‘vertical’,	and	dis-
content	within	the	regional	elites	with	their	limited	autonomy,	one	can	hardly	
speak	of	the	regions	adopting	a	consolidated	position	on	the	systemic	improve-
ment	of	their	situation,	and	nothing	like	a	regional	‘Fronde’	exists.	This	is	due	
to	several	factors:
•	 the regional elites’ limited instruments of influence on the centre.	
While	the	Kremlin	has	extensive	instruments	of	pressure	on	the	regions,	
50	 Civil	 Initiatives	 Committee	 report,	 14	August	 2013,	 http://komitetgi.ru/analytics/788/	 #.	
Uiid5Zyyx1k.	Among	 the	best	 known	politicians	who	have	 joined	 the	Civic	 Platform	are	
Yevgeny	Urlashov,	now	the	former	mayor	of	Yaroslavl	(who	had	previously	been	a	member	
of	United	Russia);	Yevgeny	Roizman,	the	mayor	of	Yekaterinburg,	and	Solomon	Ginzburg	
and	Konstantin	Doroshok,	well-known	opposition	MPs	from	the	Kaliningrad	oblast.
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both	legal	and	informal,	the	regions’	instruments	of	leverage	are	mostly	in-
formal	and	relate	to	issues	of	a	limited scope.	Along	with	their	departure	
from	the	Federation	Council,	the	regional	leaders	have	lost	their	influence	
on	the	Russian	legislation	at	the	federal	level.	Their	current	potential	in-
cludes	lobbying	in	the	Presidential	Administration,	and	(through	selected	
Duma	deputies)	the	Federation	Council	senators	(who	represent	the	regions	
at	least	formally)	and	regional	business	structures	(for	example,	a	large	Ta-
tar	business	lobby	operates	in	Moscow).	Some	regions	are	also	looking	for	
ways	to	strengthen	their	lobbying	potential;	the	Tatarstan	government	has	
signed	an	agreement	with	leading	news	agencies	to	have	positive	reports	
about	the	republic	published.	Moreover,	threats	(real	or	exaggerated)	com-
ing	from	some	regions	are	regarded	as	one	of	the	tools	they	can	use	to	put	
informal	pressure	on	Moscow	and	serve	as	arguments	in	efforts	to	obtain	
some	 concessions	 or	 increased	 funding.	One	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 2010	
protests	 in	Kaliningrad	 (one	of	 the	first	massive	protests	 in	Russia	 after	
2000),	which	were	allegedly	supported	(implicitly	and	indirectly)	by	part	
of	the	regional	administration.	This	was	aimed	to	strengthen	the	feeling	of	
the	region’s	discontent	with	the	policies	of	the	Kremlin-appointed	gover-
nor	Georgy	Boos.	As	a	result,	this	Moscow-based	governor	was	replaced	by	
a	politician	from	the	region.	The	ethnic	republics	also	seem	to	be	exerting	
pressure	on	Moscow;	Tatarstan	and	Bashkortostan	have	apparently	been	
‘blackmailing’	Moscow	with	the	activity	of	radical	Islamic	groups	on	their	
territories,	as	well	as	with	growing	nationalist	sentiments,	and	even	the	
rise	of	regional	‘separatism’51.
•	 thinking in terms of private interests	–	the	interests	of	their	own	re-
gion,	and	most	often	the	interests	of	regional	ruling	clans.	It	is	mainly	in-
dependent	experts	who	formulate	the	supra-regional	objectives	and	strate-
gies,	while	the	political	elites	in	the	regions	think	in	terms	of	the	diverging	
interests	of	individual	regions	who	have	to	compete	with	each	other	for	the	
same	pool	of	funds	from	the	central	budget,	and	this	rivalry	is	a	zero-sum	
game.	But	even	within	one	region,	the	authorities	do	not	so	much	seek	fa-
vourable	systemic	solutions,	as	they	pursue	lucrative	projects	that	would	
be	 ‘managed’	by	structures	associated	with	 the	regional	administrations	
(see	section	2,	the	case	of	Tatarstan).
51	 In	the	opinion	of	pro-Kremlin	experts,	this	‘blackmail’	of	the	ethnic	republics	is	manifested	
in	the	activity	of	illegal	Islamic	organisations,	including	numerous	attacks	on	representa-
tives	of	moderate	Islam,	or	parades	through	the	streets	of	Kazan	of	columns	of	cars	with	
flags	of	the	radical	Islamic	party	Hizb	ut-Tahrir.	More	in	R.	Suleymanov,	op. cit.
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•	 the inability to consolidate at the level of regional elites.	Russia	lacks	
a	public	platform	for	debates	on	the	regional	policy.	The	main	barrier	for	
regional	consolidation,	or	even	for	launching	a	public	debate	on	the	rela-
tionship	between	the	centre	and	the	regions,	is	the	attitude	of	the	Kremlin,	
which	opposes	any	decentralisation	of	power	and	bandies	about	concepts	
such	as	 the	 ‘threat	of	separatism’	and	the	 ‘menace	of	Russia’s	disintegra-
tion’.	Another	factor	unconducive	to	any	consolidation	and	elaboration	of	
common	demands	is	the	attitude	of	the	governors	themselves.	The	absolute	
majority	of	the	current	heads	of	regions	are	not	politicians	in	the	full	sense	
of	the	term;	they	are	the	Kremlin’s	appointees,	with	no	habits	of	public	pol-
icy	and	no	ability	to	think	in	terms	of	the	public	interest	and	the	common	
good.	This	problem	is	additionally	exacerbated	by	a	wider	social	problem	in	
Russia,	namely	social	atomisation,	a	lack	of	mutual	trust	and	the	habits	of	
coordinating	collective	initiatives.
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V. MonocentrisM striKes BAcK
Vladimir	Putin’s	return	to	the	Kremlin	in	May	2012	was	a	turning	point	that	
separated	the	more	liberal	(in	form)	rule	of	President	Medvedev	from	another	
stage	 of	 the	 centralisation	 policy	which	 Putin	 re-launched.	 This	 policy	was	
partly	a	response	to	unrest	within	the	elites	and	society,	including	some	‘slack-
ness’	in	the	regions,	the	measurable	effect	of	which	was	United	Russia’s	weaker	
electoral	results	in	2011.	Putin’s	policy	has	resulted	in	the	reorganisation	of	the	
Kremlin’s	regional	policy,	both	in	terms	of	its	content,	as	well	as	its	personal	
and	structural	composition.
The	 attempt	 to	 strengthen	 control	 over	 the	 regions	 and	 over	 the	 entire	 do-
mestic	policy	has	entailed	personnel changes and the reorganisation	of	the	
Presidential	 Administration.	 Vladislav	 Surkov,	 the	 previous	 regional	 policy	
strategist,	has	been	marginalised;	his	strategy	concerning	the	regions	and	the	
entire	domestic	policy	was	considered	ineffective,	as	it	had	failed	to	prevent	the	
emergence	of	open	discontent	against	the	Kremlin	in	the	society,	regional	and	
business	elites.	Surkov’s	role	was	taken	over	by	the	deputy	head	of	the	Presi-
dential	Administration,	Vyacheslav	Volodin,	who	has	a	reputation	as	a	 loyal	
executor	of	Putin’s	orders	and	an	advocate	of	 ‘direct	control’	methods.	Volo-
din	has	reorganised	the	Presidential	Domestic	Policy	Directorate	and	replaced	
Surkov’s	people	with	his	own	protégés.	The	Directorate	was	expanded:	the	two	
divisions	previously	dealing	with	regional	policy	have	been	multiplied	to	six.	
One	of	them,	responsible	for	the	overall	strategy	of	regional	policy,	was	head-
ed	by	Alexei	Anisimov,	a	deputy	head	of	Vladimir	Putin’s	election	staff	in	the	
last	presidential	election52.	These	structural	changes	have	also	strengthened	
the	subordination	of	regional	administrations;	at	the	level	of	federal	districts	
and	the	regions,	domestic	policy	departments	were	established	(or	expanded),	
modelled	on	the	structure	of	the	Presidential	Administration	(in	many	regions	
they	were	headed	by	deputy	governors).	The	work	of	United	Russia’s	regional	
branches	was	supported	by	more	recognisable	politicians	sent	from	Moscow	
headquarters53.
The	role	of	presidential	plenipotentiary	representatives	in	the	federal	districts	
has	been	marginalised,	 and	many	of	 them	have	been	replaced54.	 In	2012	 the	
52	 For	 details	 see	 Administratsiya	 Prezidenta	 zavershila	 reformu	 upravleniya	 vnutrenney	
politiki,	http://www.lenta.ru,	15	March	2012.
53	 M.	Tirmaste,	‘V	regiony	spustili	vnutrennuyu	politiku’,	Kommersant,	4	June	2012.
54	 The	most	 interesting	nomination	was	 the	appointment	of	 Igor	Kholmanskikh	as	a	presi-
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Kremlin	also	initiated	an	ongoing	replacement	of	those	regional	leaders	who	
were	 considered	 ineffective	 (such	as	 the	governors	of	 the	Stavropol	 and	Za-
baykalsky	krais	 and	 the	Omsk,	Magadan,	Vladimir	 and	 Ivanovo	oblasts),	 or	
those	who	were	considered	Surkov’s	protégés	 (such	as	Mikhail	Yurevich,	 the	
governor	of	Chelyabinsk	oblast).	The	departure	of	governors	appointed	dur-
ing	Medvedev’s	presidency,	such	as	Nikolai	Tsukanov	(Kaliningrad),	Nikolai	
Ignatiev	(Chuvashia)	and	Igor	Orlov	(Archangelsk	oblast),	is	also	expected.	In	
addition,	the	Kremlin	has	tightened	its	control	over	regional	security	agencies:	
in	November	2013	Putin	initiated	the	process	of	subordinating	regional	pros-
ecutors	directly	to	the	president	(before	they	had	been	appointed	by	the	Pros-
ecutor	General	of	Russia)55.
The	Kremlin	is	pursuing	a	dual	strategy	concerning	the	regional	elites.	On	the	
one	hand,	this	involves	demonstrations	of	concessions	to	the	regions,	i.e.	the	
restoration of formal democratic procedures,	and	on	the	other	hand,	it	in-
troduces	rigorous	methods	of	control	over	those	new	procedures,	which	dis-
torts	their	impact	almost	completely.	As	a	result,	the	concessions introduced 
by Moscow appear to be just an empty gesture.	The	decentralisation	and	the	
transfer	of	some	competences	 to	 the	regional	 level,	as	announced	by	 former	
President	Medvedev	 and	 prepared	 by	 two	 government	working	 groups	 (led	
by	deputy	PMs	Kozak	and	Khloponin)	have	ultimately	brought	no	results.	The	
restoration	of	general	elections	to	the	posts	of	regional	leader	(under	the	act	of	
1	June	2012)	has	been	subject	to	so	many	blocking	mechanisms56	that	Moscow	is	
still	able	to	maintain	the	control	over	the	election	process	as	early	as	the	stage	
dential	plenipotentiary	representatives	in	the	Ural	Federal	District.	Kholmanskikh,	a	tank	
factory	engineer	from	Nizhny	Tagil,	is	best	known	for	his	statement	during	the	mass	anti-
Putin	demonstrations	in	Moscow	in	2011;	in	front	of	television	cameras	he	offered	to	come	
to	Moscow	with	his	co-workers	and	‘teach	the	protesters	a	lesson’.	Also,	two	representatives	
associated	with	Medvedev	and	Surkov	have	been	replaced:	Nikolai	Vinnichenko	(North-
Western	Federal	District)	was	replaced	by	the	FSB	officer	Vladimir	Bulavin,	and	Oleg	Govo-
run	(who	managed	the	Central	Federal	District	for	a	year)	was	replaced	with	the	St.	Peters-
burg-based	Alexandr	Beglov.
55	 In	October	2013,	Putin	submitted	a	draft	constitutional	law	to	the	Duma	that	extends	the	
president’s	powers;	the	project	entails	the	president’s	right	to	appoint	and	dismiss	not	only	
the	Prosecutor	General	 (as	 is	the	case	at	the	moment),	but	also	his	deputies	and	regional	
prosecutors.
56	 The	main	mechanism	of	the	Kremlin’s	control	over	the	election	of	regional	leaders	is	the	so-
called	‘municipal	filter’,	i.e.	the	requirement	for	the	candidates	to	collect	signatures	from	
5	to	10%	of	councillors	in	75%	of	all	local	municipalities	in	their	area.	The	executive	branch’s	
control	over	the	councillors	makes	it	virtually	impossible	for	the	opposition	candidates	to	
meet	this	requirement,	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	even	in	Moscow	Alexei	Navalny	was	
unable	to	collect	the	required	number	of	signatures,	and	had	to	accept	the	assistance	of	his	
main	rival,	the	incumbent	mayor	Sergei	Sobyanin.
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of	the	candidates’	registration.	In	addition,	the	Kremlin	freely	uses	its	right	to	
dismiss	governors,	which	makes	it	possible	to	hold	early	elections	and	appoint	
the	candidate	it	supports	as	acting	head	of	the	region	until	the	elections.	This	
fossilises	the	principles	from	the	times	when	governors	were	de facto	appoint-
ed	by	the	Kremlin:	regional elites seek the support of the Kremlin	to	a	far	
greater	degree	than	the	support	of	regional	groups	and	societies.	At	the	same	
time,	it	almost	completely	wrecks	any	real	political	competition	at	the	regional	
level57.	As	a	result,	in most cases the ‘new’ practice of electing regional gov-
ernors is no different from the ‘old’ practice of their appointment by the 
president.	Moreover,	the	effect	of	this	change	has	been	further	weakened	by	
the	amendment	adopted	in	April	2013,	at	the	initiative	of	President	Putin,	that	
offers	the	regions	the	possibility	to	abandon	the	procedure	of	electing	the	gov-
ernor	and	restore	the	procedure	of	his	appointment	by	a	regional	parliament	
upon	the	nomination	of	the	Kremlin	(so	far,	this	procedure	has	been	restored	
in	Dagestan	and	Ingushetia).
Several	other	amendments to the regional electoral legislation,	sometimes	
presented	as	a	sign	of	democratisation,	were	merely	attempts	by	the	Kremlin	
to	adapt	to	changing	social	and	political	conditions.	The	increase	in	November	
2013	of	the	share	of	deputies	elected	in	single-member	constituencies	from	50	
to	75%	was	mainly	due	to	the	decline	 in	support	for	the	pro-Kremlin	United	
Russia	party.	The	amendment	to	the	party	legislation,	which	came	into	force	
in	April	2012	and	significantly	simplified	the	registration	of	new	parties,	was,	
surprisingly,	also	beneficial	for	the	government,	as	it	has	resulted	in	an	enor-
mous	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	parties,	most	 of	which	are	marginal.	 Some	
of	them,	due	to	a	similarity	of	names,	 ‘stole’	votes	from	opposition	parties	in	
the	elections	(such	as	the	newly	formed	Communists	of	Russia	and	the	CPSU,	
which	took	away	several	percent	of	the	votes	from	the	‘official’	Communist	Par-
ty	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	several	regions).	Moreover,	the	participation	of	
these	parties	(in	Russia	they	are	called	‘spoilers’)	in	elections	has	contributed	
to	the	dispersion	of	votes	and	the	inability	of	most	of	the	parties	to	cross	the	
election	threshold.	During	the	process	of	distributing	seats,	these	‘lost’	votes	
would	be	taken	over	by	the	elections’	favourite	–	in	this	case,	United	Russia58.	
57	 An	exception	to	this	rule	was	the	elections	for	mayor	of	Yekaterinburg,	won	by	Yevgeny	
Roizman,	an	independent	local	candidate	opposed	to	the	Sverdlovsk	oblast	governor	Yevg-
eny	Kuyvashev.	However,	the	powers	of	the	mayor	in	this	city	are	very	modest	and	limited	
to	representative	functions	(economic	issues	are	managed	by	a	hired	city	manager);	moreo-
ver,	it	can	be	assumed	that	Moscow	most	likely	consciously	decided	not	to	block	Roizman	in	
order	to	‘discipline’	the	governor	Kuyvashev.
58	 In	the	regional	elections	on	8	September	2013,	approximately	30-40%	of	the	votes	were	cast	
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Another	manipulation	made		in	the	interest	of	the	government	was	to	schedule	
regional	elections	 for	 the	second	Sunday	of	September	–	on	 the	one	hand,	 it	
made	 	it	more	difficult	 for	 the	opponents	 to	prepare	 their	 election	campaign	
(which	took	place	during	the	holidays),	and	on	the	other	it	decreased	the	turn-
out,	which	in	Russia	is	traditionally	considered	to	be	conducive	to	the	authori-
ties’	manipulations	of	the	electoral	results.
Another	formal	tool	 to	control	 the	regions	 is	 the	expanded mechanism for 
verifying	the	regional	elites’	work.	Under	Vladimir	Putin’s	decree	of	January	
2013,	the	procedure	of	the	governors’	dismissal	was	extended;	the	right	to	de-
mand	 this	dismissal	was	granted	 to	 federal	 government	ministers,	who	are	
often	 critical	 of	 the	 regions	 (for	 example,	 the	Minister	 of	 Finance	 regularly	
criticises	the	regions	for	the	lack	of	fiscal	discipline);	the	final	decision	to	dis-
miss	the	head	of	the	region	remains	the	president’s	prerogative.	The	list	of	cri-
teria	measuring	the	effectiveness	of	regional	leaders,	which	was	prepared	by	
the	Presidential	Administration,	includes	the	implementation	of	presidential	
decrees	and	the	region’s	ethnic	and	religious	stability59.	 In	October	2013,	 the	
Duma	passed	a	law	making	the	regional	and	local	authorities	responsible	for	
the	prevention	of	ethnic	conflicts	in	their	regions60.	This	exposes	the	regions	
to	further	criticism	from	Moscow	in	a	situation	of	rising	ethnic	tension	in	Rus-
sia,	even	though	the	source	of	this	problem	is	to	a	great	extent	the	policy	of	the	
centre	 (including	 the	unregulated	principles	of	migration,	 and	an	extensive	
grey	zone	of	illegal	migrant	labour).
In	the	economic	sphere,	Moscow’s	strategy	towards	the	regions	is	based	on	in-
creasing their socio-economic obligations,	a	move	which	has	shaken the 
stability of their budget systems	and	reinforced the model of ‘direct con-
trol’ from the centre.	President	Putin’s	decrees	of	7	May	2012	burdened	the	
regional	budgets	with	the	need	to	raise	salaries	in	the	budget	sector,	which	in-
creased	their	spending	by	5%.	This	requirement	has	not	been	compensated	by	
equivalent	transfers	from	the	central	budget.	The	regions’	income	has	also	de-
creased	due	to	the	economic	slowdown,	which	has	led	to	the	reduction	of	taxes	
collected,	including	income	tax	(the	share	of	taxes	in	the	regions’	income	fell	
from	28%	to	22%	over	the	period	2008-2013).	As	a	result,	the	deficit	of	regional	
for	parties	that	did	not	cross	the	threshold,	which	contributed	to	the	improvement	in	the	
performance	of	the	elections’	favourite,	United	Russia:	after	the	final	distribution	of	seats	
the	party	gained	an	average	of	77%.	J.	Rogoża,	‘Regional	elections	in	Russia’,	op. cit.
59	 http://www.minregion.ru/upload/documents/051113/051113_794.pdf
60	 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1720890.html
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budgets	more	 than	 doubled	 in	 2013,	 reaching	 $22	 billion;	 two-thirds of re-
gional budgets currently have a deficit61.	This	trend	will	continue	in	2014;	
the	cost	of	 salary	 increases	 for	public	 sector	employees	 for	 regional	budgets	
will	rise	by	7%,	and	in	some	regions	by	up	to	10%.	The	regions’	income	has	ad-
ditionally	been	reduced	by	the	central	authorities’	tax	policy;	the	centre	grants	
numerous	 tax	reliefs	 to	 large	corporations	which	operate	 in	Eastern	Siberia	
and	the	Far	East,	mainly	concerning	taxes	that	go	to	regional	budgets	(income	
tax,	land	and	real	estate	tax).	Incidentally,	no	rebates	are	granted	for	the	taxes	
that	are	directed	to	the	federal	budget	(such	as	the	Mineral	Extraction	Tax).
Due	to	the	shrinkage	of	revenues,	the	regions	have	assigned	a	major	share	of	
them	for	current	liabilities,	while	a	great deal of investments, including in 
infrastructure, have been cut.	This	problem	now	concerns	not	only	the	least	
developed	regions,	but	also	the	industrialised	ones,	such	as	the	Chelyabinsk,	
Sverdlovsk	and	Irkutsk	oblasts.	The	deterioration	of	the	financial	situation	in	
the	regions	has	 forced	 the	regional	governments	 to	make	unpopular	cuts	 in	
social	spending;	closing	schools	and	hospitals	in	smaller	towns,	and	reducing	
the	scope	of	free	benefits62.	Moscow	in	turn	is	using	this	for	propaganda	pur-
poses;	the	centre	blames	the	regional	authorities	for	the	liquidation	of	social	
infrastructure	and	an	increase	in	municipal	tariffs.	Despite	the	reduction	of	
their	investment	plans,	the	regions	become	further	indebted	as	they	have	to	
cover	the	expenditure	resulting	from	the	presidential	decrees	of	7	May	2012,	
which	 requires	 incurring	 further	 loans.	 In	 2013,	 28	 regions	 issued	bonds	 to	
mend	their	financial	situation,	although	these	do	not	always	enjoy	sufficient	
demand,	since	they	have	to	compete	with	the	federal	bonds	and	those	issued	
by	state-owned	companies.
The	central	authorities’	decisions	have	disturbed	the	stability	of	regional	budg-
et	systems,	which	strengthens	the	mechanism	of	direct	control	from	Moscow.	
The	 central	 authorities	 are	 seeking	 to	maintain	 their	 control	 over	 regional	
spending,	and	assign	financial	aid	in	the	form	of	subsidies	for	specific	purpos-
es,	such	as	the	implementation	of	federal	target	programs,	specialised	medi-
cal	 assistance,	 equipment	 for	 sports	 centres,	 the	 implementation	 of	 energy	
61	 In	the	first	half	of	2013,	the	income	tax	raised	fell	by	20%,	and	transfers	from	the	federal	
budget	fell	by	15%.	The	average	debt	of	regional	and	local	governments	in	September	2013	
exceeded	25%	of	their	income.	See	N.	Zubarevich,	‘Chetyre	Rossii:	Chto	dalshe’,	Vedomosti,	
24	September	2013.
62	 This	 reduction	 affects	 selected	 specialisations:	 for	 example,	 schools	 fire	 child	 psycholo-
gists,	speech	therapists,	music	teachers,	etc.	N.	Zubarevich,	‘Chetyre	Rossii	na	odnoy	ter-
ritorii’,	Novaya Gazeta,	18	November	2013.
39
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
efficiency	programmes,	the	organisation	of	sporting	events,	economic	forums,	
etc.	At	the	same	time,	the	decisions	on	how	these	funds	are	allocated	by	the	
centre	 are	 far	 from	 transparent,	which	 reinforces	 the	arbitrary nature of 
Moscow’s support for the regional budgets.
Along	with	its	legislative	tools,	the	Kremlin	has	a	wide	range	of	instruments	
for	 putting	 informal pressure	 on	 regional	 governors	 or	 city	mayors,	 such	
as	 involving	 the	 institutions of force	 or	wielding	corruption allegations.	
The	campaign	of	harassment	against	officials	and	(also	regional)	politicians,	
intended	 to	 discipline	 them	 and	 conducted	 under	 anti-corruption	 banners,	
was	 reinforced	 following	Putin’s	 return	 to	 the	Kremlin.	The	most	outstand-
ing	example	in	this	context	is	the	case	of	Yaroslavl	city;	as	already	mentioned,	
the	mayor	elections	in	the	city	in	2012	were	won	by	an	opposition	politician,	
Yevgeny	Urlashov,	who	had	left	United	Russia	and	run	a	campaign	critical	of	
the	party	and	the	Kremlin,	and	after	his	victory	completely	replaced	the	city	
managing	team.	In	response,	Moscow	first	applied	economic	sanctions	to	the	
city	(Gazprom	cut	off	gas	supplies	to	the	city’s	heating	plants	and	the	residents	
were	deprived	of	hot	water),	and	in	July	2013	Urlashov	was	arrested	over	cor-
ruption	allegations	and	still	remains	in	custody.	So	far,	the	harshest	sentence	
for	a	crime	of	corruption	against	a	regional	politician	was	a	sentence	of	nine	
and	half	years	in	a	penal	colony	for	the	former	governor	of	Tula	oblast,	Vyache-
slav	Dudka.	The	campaign	continues,	and	one	of	its	most	recent	victims	is	the	
former	mayor	of	Astrakhan,	Mikhail	Stolyarov,	who	was	arrested	in	Novem-
ber	2013.
The	reactivation	of	the	policy	of	centralisation	following	Vladimir	Putin’s	re-
turn	to	the	Kremlin	has	further	strengthened	the	system	of	the	regional	elites’	
dependence	on	the	centre.	It	implies	the	Kremlin’s	strict	political	control	over	
the	election	and	activity	of	regional	elites,	and	further	 limits	their	room	for	
manoeuvre	in	the	financial	sphere.	This	intensifies	bilateral pressure on re-
gional elites who	have	increasing	difficulties	balancing	between	the	demands	
of	 the	centre	and	 the	growing	dissatisfaction	of	 regional	businesses	and	so-
cieties	(whose	social	situation	is	deteriorating).	While	in	the	short	term,	this	
‘grip’	weakens	the	assertiveness	of	regional	elites	and	forces	them	to	be	loyal	
to	 the	Kremlin,	 in	 the	 long	 run	 the	policy	of	hyper-centralisation	 increases	
the	risk	of	rising	discontent,	which	may	quickly	find	a	vent	if	the	central	gov-
ernment	weakens.	Moreover,	 this	model	of	 relations	 is	not	conducive	 to	 the	
efficiency	internal	development	of	the	regional	economies,	as	evidenced	by	the	
steadily	decreasing	number	of	donor	regions	and	the	growing	indebtedness	of	
regional	budgets.	Analysis	of	the	Russian	ruling	elite’s	priorities	suggests	that	
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this	inefficiency	is	the	cost	that	the	Kremlin	is	willing	to	pay	for	ensuring	the	
regional	elites’	loyalty	and	obedience.	However,	this	system	can	only	continue	
when	the	financial	situation	of	the	central	budget	is	sound	and	the	inflow	of	
funds	is	constant,	which	would	make	it	easier	to	mask	the	inefficiency	of	this	
management	model.
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Vi. prospects: decentrALisAtion AHeAd  
(But WHAt Kind oF decentrALisAtion?)
Due	to	Russia’s	legal	and	institutional	weaknesses,	the	relations	between	the	
centre	and	the	regions	are	only	governed	by	the	constitution	and	formal	laws	
to	a	certain	extent,	and	are	heavily influenced by political, economic and 
social conditions,	as	well	as	the	personal	circumstances	of	the	ruling	team,	
which	makes	them	cyclical by nature.	This	latter	point	is	illustrated	by	the	
transition	from	a	personalised	‘negotiated	federalism’	from	the	1990s	with	the	
focus	on	the	 influential	 regions,	 to	 the	hyper-centralisation	 launched	 in	 the	
next	decade,	when	the	scales	tipped	toward	the	centre.	This	change	in	the	cen-
tre/regions	relations	was	mainly	brought	about	by	personal	and	political	fac-
tors	related	to	the	change	in	Russia’s	leadership	and	the	economic	boom,	while	
the	legal	issues	were	treated	instrumentally;	they	did	not	so	much	lead	to	the	
changes	as	they	sanctioned	them	post factum.	Therefore,	it	is	worth	stressing	
that	the	current	form	of	relations	between	Moscow	and	the	regions	is	not	im-
mutable,	permanent	and	final	either;	and	the	key factor that could initiate 
change is the situation in the ruling camp of the federal elite.
Currently,	Russia	seems	to	be	preparing to	face the next cycle,	as	there	are	
signs	of	changes	in	conditions	relevant	for	the	stability	of	the	central	govern-
ment.	On	the	one	hand,	the	economic situation	is	becoming	more	complicat-
ed;	Russia	is	entering	a	period	of	stagnation,	which	in	terms	of	social	and	eco-
nomic	consequences	may	be	more	severe	than	the	crisis	of	2008-200963.	This	
has	brought	the	Kremlin	up	against	the	prospects	of	declining	revenues,	and	
will	 impose	 spending	cuts	at	both	 federal	 and	 regional	 levels64.	Other	prob-
lems	include	the	deteriorating	effectiveness	of	management	and	rampant	cor-
ruption,	which	makes the russian economy extremely capital-intensive;	
even	the	current	high	prices	of	raw	materials	are	no	 longer	sufficient	 to	en-
sure	Russia	an	adequate	GDP	growth65.	These	economic	problems	may	result	
63	 N.	Zubarevich,	‘Chetyre	Rossii	na	odnoy	territorii’, op. cit.
64	 The	draft	budget	for	2014	entails	cuts	in	social	spending,	as	well	as	expenditure	on	educa-
tion,	health,	culture	and	other	spheres,	for	the	first	time	in	years.	For	details	see	E.	Fischer,	
‘Projekt	budżetu	federalnego	na	rok	2014	–	cięcia	zamiast	reform’,	2	October	2013]	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-10-02/projekt-budzetu-federalnego-na-rok-
2014-ciecia-zamiast-reform
65	 In	 2013,	 the	 average	 annual	 price	 of	 a	 barrel	 of	 Urals	 oil	 amounted	 to	 US$105,	 and	 GDP	
growth	reached	only	 1.3%	 (it	had	originally	been	estimated at	 3.7%);	 in	2012	GDP	growth	
totalled	3.5%.	Data	from	Rosstat	and	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development,	quoted	by	V.	In-
ozemtsev,	‘Ne	budet	ni	defolta,	ni	rezkoy	devalvatsii.	No	zhyt	pridyotsya	tugo’,	Komsomols-
kaya Pravda,	3	December	2013.
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in	numerous	systemic,	political	and	social	consequences:	the	exacerbation	of	
disputes	within	the	ruling	elite	over	dwindling	resources,	crises	in	different	
spheres	exposing	the	inefficiency	of	the	management	model,	rising	social	dis-
content	and	accelerating	decline	in	support	for	the	ruling	camp.
The	weakening of the ruling elite’s	 legitimacy is	 another	key	 factor	 that	
will	 tend	 to	develop	 in	 the	coming	years,	despite	 successive	demonstrations	
of	power	by	Vladimir	Putin.	Apart	from	economic	 issues,	many	durable	and	
long-term	factors	contribute	to	this	weakness	(albeit	increasing	gradually	as	
yet):	the	emergence	of	new	groups	in	Russian	society	whose	interests	and	vi-
sion	of	the	state	systemically	contradict	the	interests	of	the	current	leadership;	
a	growing	feeling	that	the	Kremlin’s	vision	of	a	centralised,	statist	country	is	
less	and	less	congruent	to	Russia’s	needs;	fatigue	at	the	unchanging	composi-
tion	of	the	elite;	the	divergence	of	interests	between	the	narrow	ruling	camp	
and	a	growing	number	of	groups	in	business	and	state	administration.	Expec-
tations	for	political	change	in	Russia	were	signalled	by	the	protests	at	the	turn	
of	2011	and	2012,	by	political	ferment	in	the	Kremlin’s	base,	and	by	the	erosion	
of	support	for	the	‘party	of	power’,	United	Russia.	After	Putin’s	return	to	the	
presidency	 in	May	2012,	 this	unrest	has	been	 largely	silenced,	 the	 loyalty	of	
many	groups	forced,	and	the	mobilisation	of	the	opposition	weakened.	How-
ever,	the	restoration	of	the	status quo ante	seems	temporary	and	fragile,	and	the	
cost	of	maintaining	it	is	growing:	the	Kremlin’s	policy	of	blocking	any	change	
involves	the	constant	use	of	force	and	resources,	and	in	addition	it	creates	new	
groups	of	malcontents,	including	within	the	state	administration,	which	in	the	
long	run	is	a	risk	factor	for	the	cohesion	of	the	ruling	team	and	the	stability	of	
the	system	of	government.
The	 prospects	 of	 the	 central	 government	weakening	 are	 likely	 to	 intensify	
the	efforts	of	the	regions	–	especially	the	more	affluent	ones,	with	a	distinc-
tive	 character	and	greater	ambitions	–	 to	modify	 the	current	model	of	 rela-
tions,	which	they	consider	unjust	and	unfavourable	to	their	development.	The	
turning	point	may	come	when	the	weakness	or	ineffectiveness	of	the	central	
government	vis-à-vis	 the	regions	 is	exposed,	 for	example,	when	Moscow	has	
a	problem	providing	support	for	loyal	regional	actors,	or	using	effective	sanc-
tions	in	case	of	insubordination.	However,	the	high	degree	of	de-institutional-
isation	in	centre/regions	relations	makes	it	difficult	to	predict	what	the	exact	
course	of	this	process	and	its	ultimate	form	could	be.	It	may	take	the	form	of	
a	chaotic process of disintegration	of	the	current	(largely	informal)	princi-
ples	and	practices.	Personal	factors	will	also	play	an	important	role	in	shaping	
a	new	model,	both	in	Moscow	and	the	regions.
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It	can	be	forecast	that	the	likelihood	of	a	further	decline	in	the	legitimacy	of	
the	ruling	elite	will	increase	the	possibility	of	changes	in	the	relationship	be-
tween	the	centre	and	the	regions	within	the	next	decade.	this	change, how-
ever, would not be equal to the creation of foundations for a fully-fledged 
federal model,	the	one	that	would	entail	the	strengthening	of	institutions,	in-
cluding	the	development	of	self-governance,	and	the	role	of	society	as	a	subject	
in	politics.	Instead,	this	change	may	signal	the	transition,	in	a	modified	form,	
to	 a	model	 reminiscent	of	 the	 1990s:	decentralised	yet	heavily	personalised,	
and	arbitrary	in	nature,	serving	the	short-term	interests	of	the	regional	rul-
ing	clans.	This	would	replicate	a	flawed	federal	system	of	government	on	the	
regional	level,	and	could	lead	to	the	formation	of	new	regional	satrapies.	The	
probability	of	this	scenario	is	increased	by	a	number	of	conditions:	the	region-
al	ruling	groups	lack	democratic	habits	(the	formal	restoration	of	general	elec-
tions	to	governorships	changed	nothing	in	this	respect)	and	strategic	think-
ing	 (the	hyper-centralisation	policy	has	only	deepened	 the	 incapacitation	of	
regional	 elites	by	 the	 centre).	At	present,	 in	most	 regions	one	may	question	
the	very	existence	of	regional	‘elites’	in	the	full	sense	of	the	word66.	Moreover,	
most	regions	lack	real	separation	of	powers,	developed	societies	and	institu-
tions	 like	a	stable	party	scene,	 independent	 judiciary,	or	 free	media.	Even	if	
the	central	authority	weakens	and	new	principles	of	relations	with	the	regions	
are	negotiated,	these	negotiations	may	prove	to	be	another	behind-the-scenes	
bargain	between	a	federal	ruling	camp	focused	on	saving	its	own	skin	and	the	
regional	politicians,	guided	by	the	interests	not	so	much	of	their	regions	as	of	
their	own	clans.	As	a	result,	a	possible	systemic	evolution	may	lead	from	the	
disintegration	of	 the	current,	centralised	and	hierarchical	model	 to	another	
form	of	deformed	federalism,	with	Russia	stuck	within	a	vicious	circle	of	cen-
tralisation	and	regional	‘parades	of	sovereignties’.
JAdWiGA roGożA
66	 Zakharov,	op. cit.,	p.	106.
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Map 1.	Russian	Federation	–	administrative	division
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